The waning of the two giants: the electoral decline of the Italian Christian Democratic Party and the Italian Communist Party by Cristiano, Giancarlo.
THE WANING OF THE TWO GIANTS: 
THE ELECTORAL DECLINE OF THE ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 
THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY 
by 
Giancarlo Cristiano 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Masters of Arts 
Department of Politics 
BROCK UNIVERSITY 
st. Catharines, Ontario 
November, 1993 
€) Giancarlo Cristiano 
ii 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Professor Terrance Carroll for his 
assistance in the completion of this thesis. Professor Carroll 
has always provided me with constructive criticism, helpful 
suggestions, and encouragement from the initial research stage 
to the writing of the final draft. His suggestions concerning 
the logic of the thesis were very beneficial. I also would 
like to thank Professor William Matheson and Professor Vince 
Della Sala for their useful comments, suggestions and support. 
Professor Matheson was particularly helpful with style and 
grammar, while Professor Della Sala helped me immensely with 
the content of the thesis. I feel that the Creator has truly 
blessed me with talented professors to supervise my thesis. I 
also appreciate Barb Magee for continually letting me use the 
computer room (Taro 452). I would also like to acknowledge my 
parents, Giacomo and AIda, for providing me with a loving home 
and a desire to learn more about my Italian heritage. Finally, 
I would like to thank Anabela for her constant patience, love, 
and support. I am eternally grateful for the many times she 
accompanied me to the University of Toronto Library. 
iii 
Abstract 
Italy is currently experiencing profound political 
change. One aspect of this change involves the decline in 
electoral support for the Italian Christian Democratic Party 
(DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), now the Democratic 
Party of the Left (PDS). Signs of the electoral decline of 
both parties began to appear in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
and accelerated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The pr imar y purpos e of th is thes is is to expla i n the 
electoral decline of the DC and PCI/PDS in the last decade. 
The central question being addressed in this thesis is the 
following: What factors contributed to the decline in 
electoral support for the DC and PCI? In addition, the thesis 
attempts to better comprehend the change in magni tude and 
direction of the Italian party system. 
The thesis examines the central question within an 
analytical framework that consists of models explaining 
electoral change in advanced industrial democracies and in 
Italy. A review of the literature on electoral change in Italy 
reveals three basic models: structural (socioeconomic and 
demographic factors), subcultural (the decline of the Catholic 
and Communist subcultures), and pol i tical (factors such as 
party strategy, and the crisis and collapse of communism in 
iv 
Eastern Europe and the former soviet Union and the end to the 
Cold War). 
Significant structural changes have occurred in Italy, 
but they do not invariably hurt or benefit either party. The 
Catholic and Communist subcultures have declined in size and 
strength, but only gradually. More importantly, the study 
discovers that the decline of communism and party strategy 
adversely affected the electoral performances of the DC and 
PC!. 
The basic conclusion is that political factors primarily 
and directly contributed to the decline in electoral support 
for both parties, while societal factors (structural and 
subcultural changes) played a secondary and indirect role. 
While societal factors do not contribute directly to the 
decline in electoral support for both parties, they do provide 
the context within which both parties operated. 
In addition, the Italian party system is becoming more 
fragmented and traditional political parties are losing 
electoral support to new political movements, such as the Lega 
Nord (LN-Northern League) and the Rete (Network). The growing 
importance of the North-South and centre-periphery cleavages 
suggests that the Italian party system, which is traditionally 
based on religious and ideological cleavages, may be changing. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The Italian political system is notorious for its 
governmental instability. This is not surprising as there have 
been 52 governments since 1945. Desp i te governmental 
instabilitYI Italy has been politically stable because, for 
most of the post-war period, the Christian Democratic Party 
(Democrazia Cristiana-DC) has been the main governing party 
and the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano-
PCI) has been the main opposition party. The continued 
dominance of the DC in government and the PCI in opposition, 
coupled wi th governmental instabi 1 i ty produced a state of 
"stable instability" in rtalian politics,:!.. However, in the 
last few years, this "stable instability" has yielded to 
instability and change, which has largely occurred because of 
a noticeable decline in electoral support for the DC and the 
pcr in the last decade. 2 The decrease in electoral support 
for the DC and the pcr is one of the most important electoral 
changes in rtalian politics in recent years. 
The paper focuses on the decline in electoral support for 
both the DC and pcr for several reasons. First, the decline in 
electoral support for both parties represents an anomaly since 
in most other western democracies when a governing party loses 
support, most of it goes to the main opposition party. 
Second, both the DC and PCI are examined together since the 
2 
electoral support of one party is derived, in part, on the 
existence of the other party. Specifically, the DC has 
benefitted from an anti-communist vote since the PCI has been 
the main opposition party, while the PCI has gathered some 
support from voters opposed to the DC regime. 
1. The Purpose of the Thesis 
The primary objective of this thesis is to explain the 
decrease in electoral support for Italy's two largest parties 
at the aggregate level. 3 The central question in this thesis 
is the following: What principal factors contributed to the 
electoral decline of the DC and pcr in the last decade? The 
secondary goal of this paper is to better understand the 
change in magnitude and direction of the Italian party system. 
Part two of this chapter provides election results for DC 
and PCI between 1972 and 1992, and part three provides a 
regional breakdown of each party's national vote. Part four 
discusses the importance of the thesis question. Part five 
examines several models that have been used to explain recent 
electoral changes in Italy. This section also integrates 
material concerning theories of electoral change in advanced 
industrial democracies. Part six outlines the thesis and part 
seven offers a chapter outline. 
2. National and Regional Electoral Results 
Table 1.1 shows election results from the 1972 national 
election to the 1992 national election. The table includes 
3 
1972 election results to cont~ast the electoral performances 
of the DC and pcr from 1972 onward. The 1992 election was 
unique because, for first time in post-war Italy, support for 
the DC fell below the 30 per cent mark and the PCI did not 
contest the election. The PCI dissolved itself in February 
1991 and formed the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito 
Democratico della Sinistra-PDS). Hardline Communists opposed 
to the dissolution of the pcr founded Communist Refoundation 
(Rifondazione Comunista-RC) in May 1991. In the 1992 national 
election, the PDS obtained 16.1 per cent of the eligible votes 
cast, while the RC received 5.6 per cent. In Table 1.1, the 
1992 figure for the pcr represents the combined vote of the 
PDS and the RC. 
The table also includes regional election results, 
beginning with the 1975 regional elections. Regional election 
results are included in the table to provide more evidence of 
the decline of the DC and PCI and because regional elections 
in Italy are "regarded less as local events and more as 
indicators of party strength at the national level."4 
The first signs of electoral volatility appeared in the 
1975 regional elections when the DC fell to 35.3 per cent and 
the pcr dramatically increased its vote to 33.5 per cent and 
came within 1.8 per cent of the DC. With voters reacting to 
the possibility of a PCI sorpasso (PCr surpassing the DC in 
voter support) in the 1976 national election, the DC increased 
its vote to appr oximately 38 per cent, a level of support 
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which it maintained until the 1983 general election. 
Nonetheless, the DC's increase in the 1976 election came at 
the expense of its minor coalition partners. 
Table 1.1 
Election Results of the DC and pcr in National and Regional 
Elections (1972-1992) 
Percentage of valid vote5 ca5t 
1972 1975* 1976 1979 1980* 1983 1985* 1987 1990* 1992 
DC 38.7 
pcr 27.2 
DC+ 65.9 
pcr 
68.8 
38.7 
34.4 
73.1 
38.3 
30.4 
68.7 
36.8 
31.5 
68.3 
32.9 
29.9 
62.8 
35.0 
30.2 
65.2 
34.3 33.4 
26.6 24.0 
60.9 57.4 
29.7 
21.7 
51. 4 
*denotes regional elections. Election results without an 
asterisk are for the Chamber of Deputies. 
Sources: Judith Chubb, "The Christian Democratic Party: 
Reviving or Surviving?", in rtalian Politics: A Review, 
Volume 1, eds. R. Leonardi and R. Nanetti (London: Frances 
Pinter Publishers, 1986), p. 70. 
Mark Donovan, "A Party System in Transformation: The 
April 1992 Election," West European Politics, 15:4 (Oct. 1992), 
p. 171-
Paolo Natale, "Lega Lombarda e Insediamento 
Territoriale: un' Analisi Ecologica", in La Lega Lombarda, ed. 
Renato Mannheimer (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991), p. 86. 
The DC did recuperate slightly from its poor showing in the 1983 
elections by improving its electoral standing in the mid-1980s. 
Nonetheless, by 1992 the DC had lost almost a quarter of the 
support it had received two decades earlier, revealing a 
significant decrease in the DC vote. 
Like the DC, the pcr (now PDS-RC) has experienced a gradual 
erosion of its electoral support. For the first time in the 
post-war period, the pcr lost votes at the national level in the 
5 
1979 election. In fact, since 1976 the PCI/PDS-RC has lost more 
than a third of its support with its greatest electoral losses 
occurring between 1987 and 1992. The decrease in electoral 
support f or the DC and pcr r epr esents a general dec 1 i ne in 
support for Italy's traditional political parties (ones in 
existence since 1945) and suggests a transformation of the party 
system.!5 
3. The Regional Breakdown of the National Vote 
This section is included in the chapter because national 
election results often conceal significant regional variations 
in voter support.s For instance, Table 1.1 indicates that the 
DC obtained 38.7 per cent support in both the 1972 and 1976 
national elections. However, does this imply that the level of 
support for the party remained the same in all regions of the 
country? Although the DC maintained its 1972 level of voter 
support, as Table 1.2 shows, its showing in the 1976 election 
did vary in each of the five geo-political zones of Italy. 
Table 1.2 also shows that the decline in support for both 
parties was not uniform. In the case of the DC, the party's 
largest losses between 1972 and 1992 occurred in the northern 
areas of the country (north-west and north-east Italy). On the 
other hand, the DC's electoral losses in the Centre and South 
were relatively small. The continued strong showing of the DC in 
the Centre and South decelerated its electoral decline at the 
national level. 
Like the DC, the PCI's electoral fall has not been uniform. 
1972 
1976 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1992 
1972 
1976 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1992 
Table 1.2 
A Regiona1 7 Breakdown of Results for the DC and PC! 
in National Elections (1972-1992) 
Percentage of valid votes cast 
North-WestS North-East' North-Centre1o 
(white zone) (red zone) 
DC PCl DC PCl DC PC! 
35.1 28.0 SO.2 16.2 31.1 40.S 
3S.2 36.2 48.3 23.S 31.8 4S.9 
33.3 32.0 4S.8 21.3 30.6 44.3 
27.4 31.4 39.7 20.8 26.1 44.6 
28.2 26.9 36.9 16.4 27.1 41.S 
21.0 19.2 29.4 12.7 22.8 37.2 
Centre South1 J. 
(Lazio) 
DC PC! DC PCl 
34.4 27.2 41.1 23.7 
3S.7 36.0 41.2 31.4 
36.5 30.2 42.9 2S.S 
30.9 29.6 37.3 24.8 
34.4 25.9 39.7 22.S 
31.0 23.7 39.3 17.6 
6 
Sources: Howard Penniman, ed., Italy at the Polls: The 
Parliamentary Elections of 1976 (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute, 1977), pp. 353-67; Howard Penniman, ed., 
Italy at the Polls, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1981), pp. 312-18; Howard Penniman, ed., Italy at the 
Polls, 1983 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), pp. 
194-203; Corriere della Sera, April 8, 1992, pp. 16-7. 
Between 1972 and 1992, the PCI incurred its heaviest losses 
in the North-west, North-east and South, but in the red zone the 
party has declined slightly. The strength of the PCI (now 
PDS/RC) in the red zone has retarded the rapid electoral decline 
of the party at the national level. Finally, except for the 1983 
election when the PCI increased its share of the vote in the red 
zone, since the 1976 election, the PCI's electoral support 
steadily fell in all five geo-political areas of Italy. 
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4. The Importance of the Thesis 
A study of the decline in electoral support for the DC and 
PCI is significant for two reasons. First, the decrease in 
electoral support for the two parties could lead to a change in 
the composition of governments in Italy. Second, it has 
compelled both parties to transform themselves and is generally 
indicative of the changes occurring in the Italian party system. 
However, before a thorough discussion of these points, it is 
essential to address arguments that downplay the importance of 
this phenomenon. 
The decline in the combined DC-PCl vote may not appear to 
be significant for some students of electoral change because 
similar declines have occurred in other countries without 
altering the nature and functioning of the party system. For 
instance, in Britain, the combined Labour and Conservative vote 
roughly averaged 90 per cent between 1945 and 1970, but between 
1974 and 1987 it only averaged 75 per cent. However, the decline 
in the aggregate share of the vote did not translate into a 
proportional loss of seats for both parties. This phenomenon 
could be attributed to Britain's first-past-the-post electoral 
system, which handsomely rewards the two largest parties. 12 
In contrast, Italy, until recently, had a system of 
proportional representation and a decrease of twenty per cent in 
voter support roughly translated into a loss of twenty per cent 
of the seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (Italy's lower 
house). In other words, the decline in the combined vote of the 
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DC and PCI is significant because it could not only affect the 
composition of government, but the government could become more 
heterogeneous and fragmented. If this trend continues, it could 
result in other parties forming governments based on new 
coalition patterns (ones that exclude the DC). However, if new 
coalition patterns are not found, ungovernability is likely. 
This is more or less what has occurred after the 1992 election. 
The lack of a stable coalition pattern has provided much of the 
impetus for the reform of Italy's electoral system. 
An examination of the electoral decline of the DC and the 
PCI is also warranted because the decrease in electoral support 
for the PCI contributed to the dissolution of the PCI and the 
formation of the PDS and the electoral decline of the DC is 
currently compelling the DC to dissolve itself and form a new 
political force. In essence, the electoral decline of Italy's 
two largest parties has resulted in their transformation. The 
transformation of the DC and the PCI is indicative of the 
general transformation of the Italian party system, in which the 
traditional parties are losing support to newly formed political 
movements. This trend may encourage new voter alignments and the 
reform of Italy's institutions. 
5. Electoral Change in Italy 
Three basic models have been formulated to explain voting 
behaviour or electoral change in Italy. One of the earliest 
models suggested that Italian voting behaviour (which includes 
electoral change) at the aggregate level was affected by 
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structural (socioeconomic and demographic) variables. 13 In 
other words, electoral change is the result of socioeconomic and 
demographic changes. This model is essentially a class-based 
model of voting which is used to explain voting behaviour in 
other advanced industrial democracies. According to the class 
model of voting, the working class generally supports parties of 
the left or socialist parties, while middle and upper class 
voters support parties of the right or conservative parties. 
One 0 f the mos t i mpor tan tel ector al changes in advanced 
industrial democracies has been the decline in the significance 
of the class cleavage. Some attr ibute this phenomenon to the 
embourgeoisement of the working class.:1.4 In other words, the 
working class grew more affluent and, in doing so, began to 
adopt middle class values. Accordingly, there was less conflict 
between the work ing and midd 1 e classes. In contras t ,ather 
theorists contend that growing occupational mobility in advanced 
industrial societies, which shifted from an agrarian economy to 
an industr ial economy and from an industr ial economy to a 
service economy, reduced the importance of class politics. Due 
to these economic changes in the advanced industr ial 
democracies, there were fewer people employed in agriculture and 
industry, but more workers employed in the service sector.J..3 
While Italy has undergone a rapid transition from an 
agrarian to a post-industrial economy, the class model of voting 
does not adequately explain voting behaviour in a country where 
religious and perhaps regional cleavages are more important. For 
10 
instance, the PCI is strongest in the anti-clerical red zone of 
Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche where small 
enterprises, artisans, sharecroppers and landless labourers are 
commonly foun~ rather than in the industrial triangle of Milan, 
Turin and Genoa. This example suggests that voting behaviour may 
be shaped not only by economic factors, but by regional and 
histor ical factors. (See Chapter Two, p. 28.) Despi te the 
limitations of this model, it will be examined to determine how 
pertinent it is to the central thesis question. 
In response to the structural model, a group of Italian 
scholars devised another model of voting behaviour, called the 
subcultural paradigm.~6 They contended that electoral 
behaviour was shaped by Italy's Catholic and Communist 
subcultures, into which most Italians were socialized until the 
19705. Many Italians voted according to their identification 
wi th one of the two dominant subcultures. According to the 
subcultural model, voting is merely an act which reaffirms an 
individual's subcultural identity. 
The term "subculture" in the Italian context has both an 
ideological and a social component. Some scholars contend that 
the ideolo<jical component is the most important aspect of a 
subculture. k7 The ideological component of a subculture refers 
to a subculture's core set of values. This core set of values 
also includes a political allegiance, which is transmitted from 
generation to generation by primary groups such as the family 
through the process of socialization.~a 
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In contrast, other scholars contend that the social 
component is more important than the ideological one. The social 
component of a subculture usually refers to the bond between an 
individual and the organizational structure or social network of 
a subculture. According to this definition of a subculture, 
political allegiance is largely the product of one's involvement 
in the social network of a subculture.~9 While both 
interpretations of a subculture are valid, it is important to 
remember that both interpretations maintain that political 
subcultures affect political loyalties. In addition, both 
interpretations contend that the strength and permanence of the 
Catholic and Communist subcultures contributed to the relative 
electoral stability of Italy until the mid-1970s. 
Both Catholic and Communist subcultures attempted to 
integrate voters into their respective subcultures through a set 
of organizations and social networks. These networks include 
sporting clubs, farm groups, youth groups, women's groups, 
unions, newspapers, pubs etc ... and they sought to protect 
subcultural members from the influence of other subcultures. In 
other words, the subcultural networks tried to segregate 
subcultural members from the rest of society and prevent them 
from interacting with individuals or groups outside the 
subculture. 2o 
The subcultural model is in fact similar to the community 
integration thesis, which is used to explain electoral change in 
advanced industrial democracies. This model is similar to the 
12 
Italian subcultural model since in Italy, the "community" often 
refers to a subculture. In the areas where the Catholic and 
Communist subcultures are the strongest, certain communities are 
dominated by one subculture. Often, newcomers to these areas 
integrate into the dominant subcul ture because they want to 
conform to the customs of the communi ty. According to the 
community integration model, voting behaviour is influenced by 
a homogeneous comrnun i ty s ett ing (fami ly, fr i ends, ne ighbour sand 
colleagues from work). Like the subcultural model, people vote 
on the basis of their degree of integration into a 
homogeneous community. However, urbanization and social mobility 
have weakened community homogeneity, thereby rendering 
communities more heterogeneous. This has made it more difficult 
for a community to mobilize support for the dominant party. This 
thesis predicts that with fewer voters taking their cues from 
the community, electoral instability will ensue. 21 
Both the Catholic and Communist subcultures provided the 
core support for the DC and PCI through their extensive 
organizational networks. However, growing consumer affluence in 
the post-war per iod brought about the secular ization (which 
i nvo I ves dec 1 in ing regular church attendance, the Roman Catho 1 i c 
Church I s reluctance to become involved in Italian poli tical 
life, and the prevalence of secular views among the population), 
and modernization (urbanization, mass culture, mass 
communications and rising levels of social and geographical 
mobility) of Italian society. It also led to the expansion of 
the education system, resulting in a 
13 
more politically 
sophisticated electorate:;::!, Secularization, modernization and 
the expansion of education produced a change in the culture and 
values of Italian society (a move from collective ideologies to 
an ideology of personal and material advancement 23 ) and 
weakened the Catholic and Communist subcultures, which may have 
led to a decline in support for the DC and PCI.~4 
The expansion of the education system in Italy parallels 
the colossal growth of secondary and post-secondary education in 
other advanced industrial democracies. This development produced 
more politically sophisticated voters.., who based their voting 
decisions on the issues and the candidates' posi tions rather 
than on the political positions of their churches, families, 
communities, work colleagues, trade unions etc ... 25 
Finally, a shift in Italy from collective values to 
individual ones has some parallels to Ronald Inglehart's model 
of value change, which invo I ves a shi ft from mater ial is t to 
postmaterialist values among the citizens of advanced industrial 
democracies. Materialist values include a concern with economic 
well-being, law and order, and external security, while 
postmaterialist values stress the importance of quality of life 
issues such as environmentalism, human rights, gender equality 
and the new morality. The unprecedented level of economic 
affluence and the absence of a major world war resulted in the 
spread of postmaterialist values. Inglehart suggests that the 
old politics of the working class (old left) versus the middle 
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class (old right) could be replaced by a new politics of 
postmaterialism (new left) versus materialism (new right).26 
A variant of the subculture thesis was developed by Arturo 
Parisi and Gianfranco Pasquino. 27 These authors ascribed 
electoral volatility to changes in the type of votes being cast. 
According to the authors, there are three types of votes. First, 
the voto di appartenenza (vote of belonging) is defined as a 
vote which is based on an identification with a particular 
subculture. Since each subculture has systematic links to a 
pol it ical party, appartenenza voters are attached to a pol i tical 
party through their subculture. '26 Of all three votes, the 
appartenenza vote is considered to be the most stable. 29 
Second, the voto di opinione (vote of opinion) describes 
voter s who support a party on the bas is 0 fits progr arome I 
policies and leadership.:3O In other words, voters base their 
decision on the conditions surrounding an election. Unlike 
appartenenza voters, most opinion voters are 
political party through the mass media.::U In 
vote of opinion is the least stable of all 
linked to a 
votes. 32 
addition, 
three types 
the 
of 
Third, the voto di scambio (vote of exchange) is a form of 
c I i entel is tic vat i ng.. wh ich entai Is that voters support the 
party or pol it ic ian that pr ovides mater ial benef its ( jobs I 
contracts, pensions, subsidies and housing). Like the vote of 
opinion, this vote is also unstable. 
According to the authors, there was a decline in the use of 
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the vote of belonging and a subsequent increase in the use of 
the votes of exchange and opinion since the mid-1970s. Exchange 
votes became more prevalent among the voters of the PCI and the 
Italian Socialist Party (PSI) because both parties controlled 
the municipal councils of many large Italian cities beginning in 
the mid-1970s and, in the 1980s, the PSI returned to national 
government with a bigger share of the patronage network. 
Pasquino and Par is i argued that the decline in the vote of 
belonging involved weaker party loyalties and created more 
opinion voters. This development made it more difficult for the 
DC and PCI to hold on to its loyal supporters, but, at the same 
time, afforded both parties an opportuni ty to capture the 
support of a growing number of opinion voters. 
A third model that is used to explain electoral change 
centres on political strategies. In particular, some analysts 
have attributed the electoral decline of the DC and PCI to the 
political strategies that both parties adopted in the 1970s and 
1980s. The DC's reliance on negative factors (anti-communism, 
defence of Catholicism) during election campaigns, and its 
inability to reform itself and shed its corrupt image, began to 
negatively affect the DC's support in the 1980s. 33 The DC's 
internal reforms (which included a promise to end cliente1ism) 
were greeted by scepticism in northern Italy where it continued 
to lose support. In southern Italy, which is more clientelistic 
than the North, the move cost the DC votes in 1983. 34 
The PCI, on the other hand, followed political strategies 
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such as the "Historic Compromise" and the "democratic 
al ternati ve n , but these st:r:ategies did not enhance the pcr IS 
credibility as an alternative to the ruling DC. In fact, some 
writers have suggested in hindsight that both strategies hu:r:t 
the PCI's image as a reformist party among radical and moderate 
reformist voters.35 
Lastly, one political factor, namely, the resolution of the 
communist question (the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, and the end to the Cold War) 
contributed to the electoral decline of both parties. 36 First, 
despite the PCI's attempts to distance itself from Soviet 
communism, the collapse of communism contributed to a decrease 
in the PCl/PDSts share of the popular vote. It revealed that the 
communist vision was for most Italians no longer viable and 
unpalatable. The decline of communism also hurt the DC because 
it received the bulk of the anti-communist vote. The ruling DC 
often used the "Communist menace" to divert attention from its 
endless factionalism, corrupt practices, malgoverno (poor 
administration of government) and clientelistic politics. 
However, wi th communism no longer an issue I I tal ians had an 
opportunity to examine the government record and policies of the 
DC without the threat of a communist alternative. The inability 
of the DC to replace its anti-communist vote with another source 
of support revealed the party's organizational weakness. 
In short, there are generally two broad approaches to the 
study of electoral change in Italy, and the electoral decline of 
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the DC and PCI in par t icular. The firs t appr oach examines 
societal trends, which includes structural changes and the 
erosion of the Catholic and Communist subcultures. The second 
approach involves political factors, such as party strategy and 
the fall of communism. 
6. The Thesis 
The thesis of this paper is as follows: political factors 
primarily and directly contributed to the decline in electoral 
support for the DC and PCII' while societal factors played a 
secondary and indirect role. Political factors include each 
party's strategy during the 1970s and 1980s as well as an 
examination of the resolution of the communist question and its 
effects on the electoral support of both parties. Societal 
changes inc I ude changes in the soc i oeconomi c and demogr aph ic 
structure and the weakening of the Catholic and Communist 
subcul tures. Al though societal changes do not completely account 
for the electoral decline of the DC and PCl, they do provide the 
background to each party ISS trategy since the mid-19 70s. In 
addition, societal factors weakened both subcultures, which 
allowed voters to be shaped by political factors. 
I place more emphasis on political factors than on societal 
ones because an explanation of the electoral fall of the DC and 
PCl based so lely on soc i etal cons iderat ions is over ly 
deterministic and diminishes the role played by parties and 
leaders in the entire political process. As one scholar stated, 
"parties are not simply passive recipients of pressure from 
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their socioeconomic, cultural, institutional and competitive 
environment."::;'7 This environment does not impr ison poll tical 
parties, but is actually shape by them. In brief, the DC and pcr 
through their strategies are partially responsible for their own 
decline. 
The idea that party leaders and the parties themselves are 
responsible for their own electoral fortunes is derived from a 
model developed by Frank L. Wilson.3s Wilson constructed a 
model of party transformation, in which he defined "party 
transformation" as a metamorphosis in the very essence of a 
party. Wilson argued that changes in the socioeconomic setting, 
political culture, political institutions and the competitive 
situation indirectly affect party transformation. The effect all 
four sources have on party transformation is governed by party 
leadership and strategy, which act as intervening variables. 39 
Although this paper deals primarily with an explanation of the 
electoral decline of the DC and PCI and briefly touches on the 
transformation of the two parties, Wilson's emphasis upon party 
leadership and strategy is valuable to the study of the 
electoral decline of the DC and pcr. Changes in the political 
cul ture and socioeconomic sett ing created opportuni ties and 
imposed constraints on the DC and pcr. However I given these 
opportunities and constraints, the thesis will argue that 
political factors best explain the electoral decline of the DC 
and pcr. 
Although the primary focus of the paper is the electoral 
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decline of the DC and PCI, it also aims to examine the recent 
changes in the party system. An examination of the Italian party 
system is important because it defines and shapes party 
strategies; "in turn, these party choices have consequences for 
the Italian party system. 
7. Chapter Outline 
The second chapter provides the appropriate background for 
later chapters. It includes a description and analysis of the 
Italian party system and the political subcultures, which are 
essential to understanding the decline of the Catholic and 
Communist subcultures, and, in turn, the electoral decline of 
the DC and PCl. In addition, the chapter includes a summary of 
the origins and early history, ideology, factions and sources of 
support of both parties. 
Chapter three examines structural changes and the decline 
of the Catholic and Communist subcultures to explain the erosion 
in electoral support for the DC and PCl. structural changes are 
first analyzed. These changes provide a mainly ineffective and 
incomplete explanation of the electoral decline of both parties. 
Next, the decline of the Catholic and Communist subcultures is 
examined. While the decline of both subcultures provides a more 
effective explanation, it is also incomplete. 
Chapter four investigates political factors and their 
impact on the decline of the DC and PCI. This analysis involves 
an investigation of the crisis and collapse of communism and its 
effect on both parties. In addition, a study of party strategy 
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demonstrates that each party's political strategy adversely 
affected its electoral strength. 
Chapter five examines changing aspects of the Italian party 
system such as the increase in party fragmentation, the decline 
in support for the traditional political parties and the rise of 
new political movements, such as the Lega Nord (Norther.n League-
LN) and the Rete (the Network). An analysis of the dramatic rise 
of the LN reveals that divisions between the state and civil 
society and between the North and South are becoming more 
salient in Italian political system. 
The f ina 1 chapter summar i zes the find i ngs and discuss es 
their significance for the Italian party system in general. A 
synopsis of the key political developments since the April 1992 
national election is offered. Lastly, a prognosis on the 
electoral fortunes of the DC and the PDS is provided. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DC AND PCI IN 'l'HE ITALr AN PARTY SYSTEM 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with the 
necessary background to understand the decline in electoral 
support for the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the 
Italian Communist Party (PCl) (now the Democratic Party of the 
Left-POB). This chapter will provide a description and brief 
analysis of the Italian party system, which is partly rooted 
in the historical subcultures of the country. A brief 
introduction to Italy's subcultures is useful because some 
observers of Italian politics have h}'pothesized tha-c the 
decline in electoral support for the DC and PCl/POS is the 
result of the weakening of the Catholic and Communist 
subcultures respectively. The last part of the chapter is 
devoted to the examination of both parties' origins and early 
history, ideology, factionalism and support. 
The Origins of the Italian Party System, 1945-
Mussolini's Fascist regime weakened and discredited most 
social organizations (except the Church), interest groups, the 
state, the bureaucracy, the monarchy and the army. When the 
regime collapsed in 1943, it created a political vacuum, which 
was quickly filled by the political parties. They gained firm 
control of the political system, in particular the state, and 
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used it to obtain support from voters.L 
Profound penetration of the 
governing political parties is 
Parti tocrazia def ines a s i tuat i on 
state apparatus by the 
known as partitocrazia. 
in which the governing 
parties not only control state resources, but permeate the 
activities of public life in general. 2 Partitocrazia 
contributes to the politicization of the state and the 
parcelling out (lottizzazione) of top posts in state agencies 
among the governing parties on a proportional basis.:3 In 
particular, faithful party supporters are appointed to these 
top posts and they use the large patronage network 
(sottogoverno) to allocate material benefits to voters 
strictly on a partisan basis. This is done to create a patron-
client network which provides the parties with a source of 
votes and funds at election time. 4 
Features of the Italian Party System 
There are three main features of the post-war Italian 
party system. First, Italy has a large number of parties 
represented in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. As Table 2.1 
shows, nine to eleven parties were represented in the Chamber 
of Deputies between 1948 and 1976. From 1979 election onward, 
at least 12 parties have gained representation in the lower 
house. The 16 parties currently in the lower house equals the 
number of parties in the 1946 Constituent Assembly. Table 2.1 
shows that the Italian party system is very fragmented and 
this has been exacerbated by Italy's use of the proportional 
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representation (PR) electoral system. 
Table 2.1 
The Number of Parties with Seats 
In the Chamber of Deputies, 1946-1992 
1946 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 
16 11 9 11 10 9 9 11 12 13 14 16 
Source: Elections Since 1945: A Worldwide Reference Compendium 
(Chicago: st. James Press, 1989), p. 180. 
Note: The 1946 figure represents the number of parties with 
seats in the Constituent Assembly. 
While the high degree of fragmentation suggests that Italy has 
a multiparty system in terms of the number of parties that are 
represented in the Italian lower house, Italian political 
scholars disagree about whether the Italian party system 
functions like a multiparty system.~ 
Second, the Italian party system is characterized by the 
presence of two major parties, the DC and PCI/PDS, and a host 
of smaller parties. The combined share of the vote for the DC 
and PCI has averaged between 60 and 70 per cent, except for 
the 1948, 1976 and 1992 national elections. Despite 
governmental instability, the underlying pattern of the 
Italian party system (the continued dominance of the DC and 
PCI), remained relatively unchanged until the early 1990s. 6 
The smaller parties may be divided into several groups 
as follows: 
-parties of the democratic centre: Italian Liberal Party 
(PLI), Italian Republican Party (PRI), Italian Social 
Democratic Party (PSDI) and Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 
since 1963 
-new political parties of the left in existence since 
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1968: the Radical party (PRad), Greens, Rete (Network), 
Proletarian Democracy (DP) and a whole host of leftist parties 
that were founded by those who split from the PCI or PSI 
-new populist parties such as the Northern League (LN) 
-parties of the authoritarian right: Italian Social 
Movement (MSI), and the Monarchist Party 
A th i rd feature 0 f the I tal ian party system is the 
ideological division of the party system into three voting 
blocs: right, left and centre. The share of the vote for each 
bloc has remained relatively stable for most of the post-war 
period. 7 The electoral stability of the ideological blocs is 
the result of a low degree of vote swi tching that occurs 
between blocs. Most vote switching occurs within the 
respective ideological areas. s 
Moreover, the ideological division of the party system 
has contributed to a lack of alternation of parties in 
government. 9 Since 1948, the DC dominated centre has been in 
power because the prospect of a PCI-Ied leftist government was 
unacceptable to Italy's allies (especially the U.S.), the 
Church and the majority of Italian voters. The PCI was barred 
from government by the other parties because it supposedly was 
"undemocratic". Thus, the same centrist parties remained in 
power and any alternation of parties in government was not 
possible until anti-communism was no longer an issue.~o 
Since there was no or little prospect of being removed from 
office, the governing parties had no incentive to govern 
competently or to be sensitive to the needs of Italian 
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citizens. As a result, governing parties became self-serving; 
immersed in their own power struggles, and grew out of touch 
with Italian society. 
Geo-political Subcultures 
Most scholars of Italian electoral behaviour attributed 
the stability of the Italian electorate to the longevity of 
various subcultures.:LJ· Different historical experiences in 
different regions of the country before and after Italian 
unification in 1870 divided Italy into distinct geo-political 
subcultures. 12 These zones are located in specific areas of 
the country and are poli tically homogeneous. 13 Most 
observers of Italian electoral behaviour assert that Italy has 
four broad regional subcultures: Catholic, Communist (also 
referred to as the Marxist or Socialist subculture), liberal 
(lay or secular) and clientelistic. The Catholic and Communist 
subcultures are the two most dominant subcultures. 14 
Although this geo-political division of Italy oversimplifies 
complex regional voting patterns, this model does facilitate 
a study of electoral behaviour and political subcultures, and 
avoids the conventional tendency to divide Italy into North 
and South. 
The Catholic subculture is strongest in north-east Italy, 
which is often called the "whi te zone". The "whi te zone" 
includes the regions of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Trento-Alto-
Adige, and Veneto and the provinces of Como, Bergamo, Brescia, 
Sondrio and Varese from the region of Lombardy. 15 The 
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Catholic subculture is dominant in the "white zone" because it 
was the local Roman Catholic clergy that spearheaded and 
backed Italian unification when this region was a part of the 
Austrian Empire. 1s In addition, the local clergy also had 
close ties with small landholders, which was the prevalent 
class at that time. 17 Thus, Catholicism represented a 
positive force in this area of the country. This is reflected 
in the Church's strong influence in the area and the people's 
general support for Cathol ic associations and the Cathol ic 
party, the DC.u, Before the DC came into existence, most 
members of the Cathol ic subculture supported the I tal ian 
Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano-PPI, the precursor to 
the DC). 
The Communist subculture is strongest in the "red zone" 
of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and the provinces 
of Cremona, Mantova, and Rieti. 19 Republican, anarcho-
syndicalist and socialist movements with strong anticlerical 
proclivities developed in this part of the country because 
this zone was part of the Papal states before unification in 
1870. The Papal states opposed Italian unification because the 
clergy believed that a united Italy would weaken the Church's 
temporal powers and lead to the spread of anti-clericalism. 
Since the Papal States opposed unification, unification was 
anti-clerical in nature. In addition, the Church supported 
large landowners against the peasant masses who were largely 
landless. Hence, the peasants were largely anti-clerical in 
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nature. 
The "r ed zone" assumed u mor e Harxi s t pos tur e j n the 1 ate 
19th century as tensions escalated between landlords and 
peasants and as the PSI, founded in 1892, made inroads in this 
area. During the Resistance, the Marxist culture became 
further entrenched since the Resistance was led primarily by 
the Communists. 20 
The liberal subculture is found in the north·-wesl: of 
Italy, specifically in the regions of Piedmont and Liguria and 
the provinces of Milan and Pavia. This area is also known as 
the "industrial triangle" of Milan, Turin and Genoa. In this 
zone, the DC and PCI receive more or less the same level of 
electo.r.al support.2~ According to Giorgio Galli, this 
subculture was the product of the industrial revolution and 
represents Italy's national political culture. 
Lastly, the clientelistic political tradition pervades 
most of Italy although it is more common in the South for 
historical and economic reasons. 2 ::< In the South, politics 
was largely dominated by local notables rather than by 
political and trade union movements. Clienteles were 
previously organized around local notables because they 
essentially provided security and material goods for their 
clients and their families. In the 1950s, the DC used the 
state apparatus to 
relationship into 
transform 
the "mass 
the personal 
clientelism 
patron-client 
of the party 
bureaucracy". This pr imar ily occurred because the DC attempted 
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to shift political loyalties of southerners from the local 
notables to the party, but this required ext ens i ve state 
patronage. Hence, the DC's use of the state apparatus 
reinforced clientelistic political behaviour in the South. 23 
Clientelism may also be more common in the South because 
unemployment is high and the state is the largest employer. In 
this zone, party organ i zat ion is less es tabl ished, voter 
allegiances less stable, and political relationships are based 
on the "vote of exchange" (patronage).24 Despite challenges 
from the far right in the early 1950s and 1970s, the PCI in 
the late 1940s and mid-1970s and the PSI in the 1980s, the DC 
is the dominant party in most of the South. In general, voters 
tend to support governing parties or parties that are likely 
to be in government. 25 
The description above indicates that Italy has a broadly-
based national political culture along side numerous 
regionally-based subcultures. The Catholic and Communist 
subcultures are the most important since they provided the DC 
and PCI with a fundamental base of support, which explained 
the dominance of the two parties in the post-war period. 26 
However, both the DC and PCI could not have become national 
parties if their basis of support was strictly regional. 27 
A SUmmary of the DC and PCl 
This section briefly summarizes the origins and early 
history, ideology, factionalism, and core sources of support 
of the DC and PCI. This will provide the appropriate 
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background for subsequent chapters regarding the electoral 
decline of both parties since the late 1970s. 
Italian Christian Democracy (DC) 
Origins and Early History 
The DC was founded in 1943 by veterans of the pre-Fascist 
PPI. The DC's first leader, Alcide De Gasperi, outlined the 
party's programmatic line to be Christian, interclass, 
centrist and socially progressive. The DC quickly became the 
dominant party of the centre and government after the Second 
World War because the PLI, which dominated Italian politics 
between 1870 and 1919, was discredited by the rise of Fascism 
in the early 1920s. 2S Furthermore, many viewed the DC as a 
primary line of defence against the PCl. Lastly, De Gasperi 
relied heavily upon the Roman Catholic Church and its 
affiliated associations, big business, local notables, and 
U.S. support to obtain votes, build the party and increase its 
membership. 
In July 1953, the DC replaced De Gasperi as party 
secretary wi th Amintore Fanfani, a move which symbolized a 
shift from idealism towards pragmatism. 29 Fanfani attempted 
to construct a party organization that was independent of the 
Church, big business, local notables, and the U.s. by 
expand ing state intervent ion, espec ially in the South. In 
particular, the DC used the public administration, local and 
national public agencies, state-owned industries and banks to 
forge patron-client relationships with voters. Hence, by the 
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mid-1950s, the DC increasingly became identified as a party 
that was associated with the state apparatus, whose resources 
were used to maintain the party in office. Nevertheless, the 
development of patronage-client relationships on a mass scale 
coupled with the control of local party sections by party 
bosses led to the proliferation and institutionalization of 
factions within the DC. 30 
The DC's hegemony first began to show signs of erosion 
when it lost a Church-sponsored 1974 referendum to repeal the 
1970 divorce law. A year later the DC suffered a setback in 
regional elections. These events compelled faction leaders to 
revitalize the DC under Benigno Zaccagnini, who became party 
secretary in 1976. Zaccagnini wanted to clean up the DC's 
corrupt image and return the party to its founding principles. 
Ideology 
There is an ongoing debate among Italian political 
scholars about the ideological nature of the DC. Some scholars 
contend that the DC is a "regime party", while others argue 
that the party is a "catch-all" or brokerage party.31 Some 
portray the DC as a "regime party" because of its perennial 
association with the state. The DC has used the state 
apparatus to aggregate different interests and establish 
enduring links with numerous organizations through patron-
client networks. Since the DC appeals to a wide variety of 
interests, it could be considered a "catch-all" party. 
However, it is unlike most standard "catch-all" parties 
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because it uses the state to attract the support of interest 
groups.:33 
The DC is also considered a "catch-all" party because it 
wants to maintain power by appealing to as many interests as 
possible. In particular, to stay in power the DC had to allow 
capi tal to develop a free market, but at the same time 
maintain social peace wi th labour. To prevent labour from 
crystallizing around the PCl, the DC introduced many welfare 
reforms and intervened in the economy regularly. The DC's 
steady control over the state and publ ic sector does not 
reflect any ideology on its part, but a reality: the presence 
of a strong opposition party that could not b"e allowed to form 
the government. Hence, the DC cannot be classified as a 
conservative or Catholic party because it is essentially a 
catch-all party. The advantage of both arguments is that they 
do not define the DC in terms of who supports the party, but 
in terms of its policies and actions. 34 
In addition, due to the catch-all party status of the DC 
and its willingness to use the state apparatus, the party's 
policies and programs tend to be amorphous and ambiguous.:35 
The ideolog ical ambigui ty of the DC is reflected in its 
mishmash of policies. The DC still maintains ties with 
conservati ve insti tutions 1 ike the Church and recently has 
focused on issues such as the family and traditional morality. 
On the other hand, the party has permitted the expansion of 
women's rights and weakened the Church's influence over 
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reI ig ious instruct i on in publ ic schoo Is. On the economic 
front, DC-led coalition governments have expanded the public 
sector economy and favoured state intervention in the private 
sector. However, since the mid-1980s the DC has followed a 
more neo-conservative economic policy that included holding 
the line on inflation and cutting social payments. Until 
recently, the DC was reluctant to spearhead a privatization 
programme of Italy's huge publ ic sector since this would 
probably dismantle the clientele network which helped the DC 
secure political power. 36 In short, the party's ideological 
ambigui ty has allowed its leaders a tremendous amount of 
flexibility. 
Factions 
Except when De Gasperi was party secretary, the party has 
been controlled by faction leaders. The party secretary is 
usually selected when some sort of consensus is reached among 
faction leaders. Factionalism is an important feature of the 
Italian party system, and is especially acute wi thin the 
Christian Democratic party and other parties in government. 
Factions, in the Italian context, are usually formed by party 
members who want to control the ideological direction of a 
party or by those who want a greater share of the spoils. 
Factions were originally due to ideological rivalries within 
the party, but today most are the result of power struggles 
among party leaders over the allocation of patronage. 37 
Evidence of this trend can be discerned by examining Giulio 
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Andreotti's Primavera faction. In the 1950s this faction began 
on the far right, but by the 1970s it had moved to the left. 
Most factions are geographically based and created when party 
notables gain control of a large provincial federation. Most 
factions have their own organization, finances, supporters, 
territorial bases and are linked to certain interest 
groups.3S 
Basis of Support 
The DC has a broad basis of electoral support that cuts 
across all social classes. HI Table 2.2 shows that the DC 
received electoral support from all social classes in 1978. In 
fact, this holds true for most Italian political parties. In 
addition, Table 2.2 shows that most of the DC's support comes 
from rural farm workers, farmers, employers and homemakers. 
Table 2.2 
Social Class and Voting Preference of Italians 
(in percentages) 
PCl PSI PSDI PRl DC PLI MSl 
Farm 
Workers 21% 21% 1% 48% 3% 1% 
Farmers 19 15 54 3 1 
Employers & 
Sm. Business 2 19 4 7 44 3 4 
Who Collar 
workers 22 22 5 7 30 3 4 
Ind. workers 45 19 2 3 25 1 
Homemakers 24 5 14 2 49 2 3 
Source: Adapted from Paolo Farneti, The Italian Party System 
(1945-1980), (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 98. (All 
figures are for 1978 except for 1968 figures for farmers and 
farm workers. In 1968, the PSI and PSDI were combined in a 
single party.) 
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The DC is strongest in the "white zone" and in the South 
due to the Catholic subculture and clientelistic subculture 
respectively. The DC's electoral support is based on four key 
factors: Catholicism, clientelism, anti-Communism and 
centrism.40 Catholicism is the most important source of 
support for the DC and anti-communism is the second most 
important. Catholicism is important to the DC because most of 
its leaders are recruited from Catholic organizations. 41 
Party leaders like Moro and Andreotti have been recruited in 
Catholic associations such as Catholic Action (AC) or the 
Catholic University Students' Federation (FUCI). Catholic 
associations also cuI ti vated leaders and forged 1 inks wi th 
workers through the Association of Italian Christian Workers 
(ACLI) and the Italian Confederation of Trade Union Workers 
(CISL), created by Catholics after the union split of July 
1948. 42 Furthermore, the DC obtained support from Catholic 
farmers through the Confederation of Small Farmers 
(Coldiretti) • 
Moreover, the DC receives a majority of its support from 
practising Catholics (those who attend mass regularly). For 
instance, a 1988 survey found that practising Catholics made 
up half of the DC's support.43 The large share of practising 
Catholics who support the DC is the characteristic that 
distinguishes the DC from other parties. Until the 1970s, 
there was a complex, reciprocal affiliation between the 
Church, Catholic associations and the DC. However, 
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secularization and modernization weakened the ties between the 
DC, the Church and the Catholic associations. 
A second pillar of Christian Democratic electoral support 
is clientelism. 44 As previously mentioned, this practice 
began in the mid-1950s when the DC consolidated its hold on 
power. However, the DC's hegemony over the sottogoverno began 
to weaken in the mid-1970s when it lost control over regional 
and municipal governments. This spilled over into the national 
arena in the 1980s when one of the conditions for the PSI's 
entry into government involved a larger share of the 
sottogoverno. 45 Nonetheless, the DC still controlled a major 
portion of the patronage network in the late 1980s. 46 
The third main feature of electoral support for the DC is 
anti-communism. Despite its scandal-ridden image, the DC was 
perceived by most Italian voters as the only party that could 
effectively prevent the PCI from coming to power. Most post-
war elections in Italy have been depicted by the DC as a 
struggle between God (DC) and Satan (PCI). The Cold War 
allowed the DC to use the "Red scare" as its electoral trump 
card. Nevertheless, the PCI's ideological moderation and its 
control of regional and local governments weakened the 
effectiveness of anti-communism in the 1980s. 
A fourth source of support for the DC is its location in 
the centre of the poli tical spectrum, which contains the 
largest share of Italian voters (roughly 31 per cent).47 
Since 1945, the DC has occupied this position and attempted to 
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maintain it by acting as a broker in Italian society. The DC's 
centrism also encompasses anti-extremism (anti-communism and 
anti-fascism). Surveys between the early 1970s and the mid-
1980s found that the DC acquired a significant majority of the 
voters who reject the MSI and PCI.48 
The Italian Communist Party (PCI) 
Origins and Early History 
The pcr was founded in 1921 by Amadeo Bordiga and Antonio 
Gramsci after a split with the PSI at the Livorno 
Congress. 49 Mussolini came to power in 1922 and by 1926 the 
PCI and other non-Fascist parties were officially banned. 
Between 1926 and 1943, the PCI operated as an underground, 
clandestine organization which suited its oligarchical party 
structure.eo 
After the fall of Mussolini, the PCI realized that its 
revolutionary strategy was inappropriate for Italy's 
circumstances. Revolution was not possible in Italy because it 
was occupied by the British and Americans, was predominantly 
Catholic, and was very tired of dictatorial rule. In addition, 
the Soviets considered Italy part of the American sphere of 
influence. Nevertheless, the PCI was still committed to its 
goal of a communist society. At a party meeting in Salerno in 
March 1944, party secretary Palmiro Togliatti declared that 
the PCI would not bring about a communist society in Italy by 
using parliamentary means (winning power through the ballot 
box) rather than fomenting an armed insurrection. Since this 
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strategy marked a radical departure from its prewar 
revolutionary strategy, it became known as the Svolta di 
Salerno (the turning point of Salerno). This event placed the 
PCI on the road towards social democracy and compelled it to 
follow an interclass strategy (add to its work ing class 
support by acquiring support from the progressive middle 
class), which resulted in the moderation of its ideology.51 
Between 1944 and 1947, the PC! served in the national unity 
governments. However, due to pressure from the U.S. and the 
Vatican, the PC! was removed from government and relegated to 
the opposition, which hindered the social democratization of 
the party.52 By 1948, the PC! became the dominant party on 
the left and Italy f s second largest party because of its 
leading role in the Resistance, and splits within the PSI.53 
Khrushchev's denunc iat ion of Stal in at the twentieth 
Soviet party congress in 1956"paved the way for the "national 
road to socialism". Togliatti once again proposed that the PCI 
take the parliamentary path to socialism, which became known 
as the via italiana al socialismo ("The Italian way to 
socialism"). By the late 1960s, the PCI was heavily criticized 
by the far-left (extra-parliamentary) left since the party 
avoided any strong critique of the free market. On the social 
front, the PCI was outdone by the PSI and the secular parties 
which introduced legislation on divorce. 54 
In the 19 70s, the PCI spearheaded 
movement and advocated the strategy 
the Eurocommunist 
of the "Historic 
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Compromise", which entailed a grand coalition of the PCI and 
DC. In the 1975 administrative elections, the party obtained 
33.5 per cent of the vote and gained control of the municipal 
councils of most large Italian cities, such as Rome and Turin. 
In the 1976 national election, the PCI garnered the highest 
level of support in its history (34.4 per cent), which 
provided an impetus for its entry into government. 
Ideology 
Although the PCI began as a Marxist-Leninist party, it 
gradually distanced itself from the Soviet model of Communism. 
The PCI leadership realized that the Soviet Communism was 
inappropriate for the exigencies of Italian society. Thus, the 
PCI was compelled to develop an indigenous brand of Communism. 
As previously stated, the pcr had abandoned the revolutionary 
practices of Marxism-Leninism, but there had been some 
ambiguity concerning its abandonment of Marxist-Leninist 
goals. 
Togliatti's "Italian way to socialism" abandoned Leninist 
tactics, but held to the Leninist notion of socialist 
transformation. Furthermore, Togliatti maintained the Leninist 
tradition by using the writings of Antonio Gramsci, one of the 
PCI's most important theoreticians, to refashion Italian 
Communism. !!!o!!!o 
By the 1970s, liberal-democratic beliefs were shaping the 
thinking of the leadership and membership of the pcr.!!!os With 
the development of Eurocommunism, the PCI not only rejected 
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Soviet Communism but critically attacked it. The PCI 
maintained that the U.S.S.R. had violated the freedoms of its 
citizens and that its social and economic policies were a 
failure. This diatribe seemed to signify that the PCl had 
abandoned its Leninist legacy. 
If the party was no longer Leninist, then where did its 
ideological identity lie? In 1978, the party staked out its 
ideological position with the obscure "third way", a middle 
posi tion between Marxism-Leninism and western social 
democracy. As the name suggests, it was touted to be an 
alternative to capitalism and communism. The goals of the 
"third way" generally corresponded to European social 
democracy, but they were usually conveyed in crypto Marxist-
Leninist terminology, which rendered the PCI's ideology 
baffling. Despite its ideological obscurity, the PCI was very 
pragmatic. It accepted and supported Italy's membership in 
NATO and the EC. It favoured a mixed economy and supported 
austerity measures, deficit reduction and wage restraint in 
the mid-1970s. In addition, the pcr took a prudent stance on 
social matters. Generally, under party Secretary Enrico 
Berlinguer the party accelerated the pace of social 
democratization. 
Factions 
Despite the PCl's formal ban on factions, "unofficial" 
factions or ideological tendencies existed in the party from 
the 1960s on. Most scholars on the PCI argue that the party 
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had four fact ions, thr ee 0 f wh ich are now a part 0 f the 
PDS.!57 A right-wing social democratic faction, originally 
led by Giorgio Amendola and later by Giorgio Napolitano, was 
known as the miqlioristi, laboristi or riformisti faction. 
This faction advocated an eventual union with the PSI and the 
formation of a sole party of the left akin to the British 
Labour Party. It also favoured improving capitalism, working 
with the lay secular parties, and placed a premium on 
governing. 
The centrist faction was usually led by and named after 
the party secretary. This faction was the most pragmatic and 
always sought to reconcile the differences between the left 
and right wings of the party. This usually resulted in vague 
and ambiguous party strategies. 
The left-wing faction, primarily associated with Pietro 
Ingrao, wanted to see the PCI enter into alliances with 
progressive Catholics and radical social movements. Unlike the 
other two factions, the Ingrao faction advocated a radical 
critique of capitalism. The faction also wanted to maintain 
the party's communist identity and emphasizes radical reform 
and social mobilization over governing. 
Finally, there was a pro-Soviet faction led by Armando 
Cossuta which wanted to safeguard the PCI's communist 
heritage. This faction split from the pcr to form the 
Communist Refoundation (RC) in 1991. 
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Basis of Support 
The PCI is strongest in the "red zone" I but also has 
support among blue collar workers in the industrial triangle. 
Like the DC, it obtained support from all social classes (See 
Table 2.2). The pcr encouraged the development of mass 
organizations to recruit party members, shape public opinion 
and garner votes. Two of the most important Communist 
affiliated associations are the General Confederation of 
Labour (CGlL) and the National League of Cooperatives (LNC). 
The CGIL was important in obtaining and maintaining the 
backing of workers, while LNC furnished the party with the 
money it made selling goods to Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a description and analysis of the 
Italian party system. It found that the party system was 
fragmented, but dominated by two parties between 1948 and 
1992. The study also discovered that Italy, for most of the 
post-war era, was governed by a partitocrazia which consisted 
primarily of the centrist parties. Coalitions were dominated 
by centrist parties because the Italian party system was 
divided into three ideological blocs, where left and right 
wing parties made unacceptable coalition partners. In 
particular, they remained in power because the main opposition 
party was the PCl, which could not come to power during the 
Cold War and in a country closely allied to the U.S. Equally 
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important, the study unveiled that the party system is 
partially rooted in regional subcultures. 
Lastly, a description and an analysis of both parties' 
early history and origins, ideology, factionalism and sources 
of support was provided. The DC is a catch-all party that has 
utilized the state to carve out a clientele network of 
support. However, its years in power tainted the party with 
corruption and stifled its reform. In contrast, the PCI has 
moderated its ideological stance and embraced social democracy 
by dissolving itself and forming the PDS. 
Chapter Three examines the socioeconomic and demographic 
changes that occurred in Italy in the post-war era to 
determine their effect on the electoral support for the DC and 
PCI. Moreover, the chapter examines whether the weakening of 
Catholic and Communist subcultures contributed to the 
electoral decline of the DC and PCI. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE DECLINE 
OF THE CATHOLIC AND COMMUNIST SUBCULTURES 
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that the 
structural model (changes in the socioeconomic and demographic 
structure) and the subcul tural model provide indirect and 
incomplete explanations of the decline in voter support for 
the DC and pcr. While these changes weakened voters' 
attachments to the DC and pcr, which resulted in fewer 
appactenenza voters and more opinion voters, they did not 
necessarily contribute to the electoral decline of the DC and 
pcr because both part i es had an opportuni ty to garner the 
support of opinion voters.1 While both models do not 
adequately explain electoral change, they provide the context 
in which both parties operated since the late 1970s and allow 
political factors to have a greater effect upon the level of 
electoral support for both parties. 2 
This chapter first indicates the structural changes in 
post-war Italy and then proceeds to demonstrate that these 
changes do not adequately explain the electoral decline of the 
DC and PCI. Next, an examination of the decline of the two 
subcultures is provided. While this explanation is more 
useful, it is still incomplete. 
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structural Changes 
The most important socioeconomic change in post-war Italy 
was the trans i tion from an agrar ian economy to a post-
industrial one. After World War TWo, Italy was primarily an 
agricultural country. In 1951, 42 per cent of the labour force 
was employed in agriculture 3 , but by 1988, only 10 per cent 
was employed in this sector, primarily in the South.4 In this 
period, employment in the industrial sector increased to 44 
per cent in 1970, but declined to 30 per cent in 1988. 5 In 
contrast, service sector employment has increased since the 
1970s. 6 These socioeconomic changes resulted in fewer farmers 
and industrial workers, a decline in the share of the petty 
bourgeoisie (the self-employed middle class) from 44 per cent 
of the labour force in 1944 to 32 per cent in 1985, and an 
increase in the number of salaried white collar workers. 
Some soc tal structural ists have suggested that these 
economic changes adversely affected voter support for the DC 
and PCI. First, they argued that the decline in the size of 
the petty bourgeoisie, which overwhelmingly supports the DC7, 
weakened the party's electoral support.s Furthermore, an 
increase in the percentage of salaried white collar workers 
(the new middle class) was detrimental to the DC and 
benefitted the parties of the left because of unionization and 
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the diffusion of post-materialist values among the post-war 
cohorts. 9 In addition, they argued that the increase and the 
subsequent decrease in the size of the industrial working 
class led to first an increase and then a decrease in voter 
support for the pcr. 
There were also several demographic changes. First, youth 
became a salient voting factor in the mid-1970s when the 
voting age for the Chamber of Deputies was lowered from 21 to 
18 years of age. This change in the franchise was more 
important in Italy than in other Western democracies because 
of its relatively high voter turnout. The entry of the these 
young voters, who were socialized during a period of rapid 
secularization (the late 1960s and early 1970s), benefitted 
the left, especially the PCI.10 
Second, in the 1970s there was an increase in the number 
of women who voted for the left. In 1968, 67 per cent of women 
supported the DC, but by 1978, this fell to 47 per cent. This 
twenty per cent decrease went to the parties of the left, 
which increased their share of the women's vote from 27 to 47 
per cent. Some have attributed this swing to the left to an 
increase in the number of working women in recent years, which 
accelerated secular ization. 11 This trend is felt to have 
hurt the DC because it is supported by more women than 
men. 12 
In addition, Italy became more urbanized in the post-war 
era with a mass exodus from the country to the city. Most of 
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the migration was from the rural South to the cities of the 
industrial triangle and from the regions adjacent to Lazio to 
the capital Rome. Substantial migration occurred between 1955 
and 1963, and then decelerated in the mid-1960s, but 
recommenced solidly between 1967 and 1971. Altogether roughly 
nine million Italians were involved in inter-regional 
migration.1. 3 The share of the population living in 
communities with less than 10,000 people decreased from 44 per 
cent in 1953 to 35 per cent in 1987; those living in mid-sized 
communities (between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants) increased 
from 31 per cent to 36 per cent in the same period. Lastly, 
the portion of the population living in communities with more 
than 100,000 people increased from 25 per cent to 29 per cent 
between 1953 and 1987.1.4 Urbanization is important because 
most students of electoral behaviour contend that urban voters 
are more likely to support leftist parties. Hence, 
urbanization appears to have benefitted the PCI and adversely 
affected the DC, which is stronger in rural areas.1.5 
Furthermore, there were changes in social conventions, 
such as a rapid decline in weekly church attendance. In 1956, 
69 per cent of the adult population attended church weekly, 
but by May 1988, this figure had fallen to 27 per cent, 
evidence of the rapid secularization of Italian society.l.S 
Social structuralists contend that the shrinking proportion of 
regular ly pract is ing Cathol ics has adversely af fected the 
electoral support of the DC, a party whose single most 
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important source of support is religion. 17 
Lastly, although there was an increase in the share of 
the unionized labour force from 27 per cent to 44 per cent 
between 1960 and 1980, by 1985 the portion of unionized 
workers fell to 36 per cent and seemed on the decline. UI 
Unionization rates fell due to the restructuring of northern 
industry, weakening the working class and reducing the power 
of the trade unions .19 Conventional wisdom suggests that 
unionization rates affect the level of electoral support for 
the left. Hence, in the case of Italy some believe that 
unionization rates affected the level of electoral support for 
the PCI. 20 
An Examination of structural Changes 
Some observers of aggregate electoral behaviour have 
contended that structural changes lead to electoral change, 
and in the case of this paper, contributed to the decline in 
electoral support for the DC and PCI. 21 Although these 
changes did affect the political strategies of both parties, 
they did not directly contribute to the decline of the DC and 
PCI. 
First, many of the structural changes occurred between 
the late 1950s and late 19605, but a significant erosion in 
electoral support for the DC and PCI did not occur until the 
1980s. 22 Second, a socioeconomic approach is flawed because 
objective class voting (based on either education, income or 
occupation) is less prevalent in Italy than in other west 
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European states. 23 Table 3.1 shows that both the DC and pcr 
are supported by a wide variety of occupational groups and 
social classes. 
-------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.1 
Social Composition of the Electorates of the DC and PCl 
(in percentages) 
Social strata DC PCl 
----------- ----------
1953 1978 1953 19'18 
l. Self-employed* 
(a) Big business 1 1 
(b) Farmers 12 5 
( c) Shopkeepers 6 5 
Subtotal 26 19 6 11 
2 . Dependent Labour 
(a)White-collar 10 11 
(c)Blue-collar 13 35 
Subtotal 21 23 68 46 
3 . Non-Active population 
(a)Homemakers 32 23 
(b)Pensioners 23 15 
(C) Students 3 5 
Subtotal 53 58 26 43 
100 100 100 100 
Source: Paolo Farneti, Italian Party System (London: Frances 
Pinter Publishers, 1985), pp. 92-3. 
*Figures were extrapolated from a 1974 survey. 
Table 3.1 indicates that the decline in the number of 
self-employed did affect the composition of the DC and 
possibly its electoral support, but the DC mitigated this loss 
by garnering the support of pensioners and homemakers. 
Pensioners may be attracted to the DC because the party used 
the state apparatus to give generous pensions to voters, 
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especially to public sector workers and southerners. 
Furthermore, homemakers tend to support the DC because they 
are more religious than men. 24 
The DC also mitigated the effects that the decline in the 
size of the petty bourgeoisie had on its electoral support by 
garnering the support of white collar workers. Although 
Inglehart and others believe that white collar workers form 
the basis of left-libertarian social movements, this is not 
the case in Italy because white collar workers in the public 
sector engage in clientelistic politics.2~ This is important 
because public sector white collar employees are the largest 
category of white collar workers. 26 Publ ic sector workers 
usually obtain their positions through the patronage network, 
which is largely in the hands of the DC. Hence, many public 
employees support the DC since it gave them employment. 
Furthermore, the broadly based composition of the PCl's 
electorate also mitigated the effects that the decline in the 
size of the working class had on the PCl's electoral support. 
Table 3.1 shows that 35 per cent of the PCl's support comes 
from the working class. However, this does not imply that the 
PCI is strictly a working class party like the French 
Communist Party or the Portuguese Communist Party. The PCl 
successfully forged links with white collar workers, artisans 
and small businesses, especially in the "red zone". To 
categorize the pcr as a working class party is reductionist 
because it defines the party in terms of who supports the 
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party, rather than by its actions and policies, and ignores 
the two-thirds who are not blue collar.27 
As mentioned previously, some attributed the decline of 
the DC and PCl to demographic changes. However, there are two 
problems wi th this assessment. First, these changes are better 
explained by secularization and modernization, processes which 
are eroding the Catholic and Communist subcultures. Next, 
demographic trends do not invariably benefit one party and 
hurt another. 2 1!1 
First, young people who voted in the 1970s 
disproportionately supported the left (more than 60%) because 
they were socialized during a period of rapid 
secularization. 29 Secularization also had an especially 
strong radicalizing effect on young women as well. Before the 
1970s, women voted disproportionately for the DC because most 
women were closely attached to the Church. Hence, the decline 
in the degree of religiosity, rather than gender, was 
important in explaining the radicalization of young women. 30 
This discussion demonstrates that structural variables like 
age and gender are closely tied to the generational changes 
such as secularization. 
Moreover, secularization (with most of it occurring 
between the late 1950s and mid-1970s 3 l.) has slowed down. 
Between 1976 and 1988, the share of the population that 
attends church regularly was between 27 and 31 per cent.'2 
Furthermore, a 1985 study found that those between 18 and 24 
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years of age were no less religious than their predecessors 
and those who attended church regularly were inclined to 
support the DC. These trends suggest that the secularization 
process may have bottomed out. 33 
Second, many demographic trends are likely to hurt both 
parties, while some may help them. First, the Italian 
population is ageing due to increasing life expectancy and a 
falling birth rate. 34 The ageing of the Italian population 
may benefit the DC because life cycle effects seem to benefit 
the DC.3~ With older voters composing a larger share of the 
electorate in the future, the DC is likely to benefit. In 
addition, young voters who disproportionately supported the 
left and pcr in the 1970s were less supportive of the PCI in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The DC's support among youth appears to 
have stabilized during this period, which represents a 
reversal from the 1970s. Lastly, the rate of urbanization 
decelerated in the late 1970s and 1980s. In reality, the 
population of Italy's ten largest cities fell by 6.6 per cent 
between 1971 and 1986, whereas mid-sized communities 
increased. 3 $ This may be a positive development for the DC 
because 40 per cent of its supporters came from these mid-
sized communities. In contrast, this development may have hurt 
the PCI which is stronger in the large urban centres. 37 
The decline in regular church attendance is an important 
factor because it explains the change in the composition of 
the DC's electorate. Nonetheless, this factor is better 
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explained by secularization. 
Similarly, the decline in trade unionism affected the 
composition of the PCI's electorate, but this variable is 
vital to understanding the decline of the Communist 
subculture. The Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL) 
was important in integrating part of the working class into 
the Communist subculture. Hence, a study of trade unionism 
within the context of the decline of the Communist subculture 
will better explain the pcr's electoral decline. 
This discussion demonstrated that structural factors 
provided an indirect and incomplete explanation of the 
electoral decline of the DC and PCI. However, this examination 
is important because it gives the context in which both 
parties have operated since the late 1970s. It also eliminated 
a possible line of explanation and prompted an analysis of 
other factors, such as the dec 1 ine of the subcultures. In 
short, the structural approach was not very useful because it 
assumes that electoral changes are strictly affected by 
socioeconomic factors rather than by political ones. 3S 
The Decline of the Subcultures 
The goal of this section is to show that while the 
decline of the Catholic and Communist subcultures gives a more 
effective explanation of the decrease in voter support for the 
DC and PCI, it is nevertheless incomplete. 39 In particular, 
this section explains that both subcultures have diminished in 
importance and size. However, both the Catholic and Communist 
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subcultures still have strong ties with their core members. It 
also outlines criteria to determine membership in a subculture 
and measures the degree of subcultural integration. Evidence 
of the erosion of both subcultures and reasons for their 
decline are presented. Next, the relationship between the 
decline of the subcultures and the erosion in electoral 
support is examined. Finally, the problems associated with the 
subcultural approach are investigated. 
Indicators of Membership in a Subculture 
Several indicators have been employed to identify a 
member of a subculture. A member of the Catholic subculture 
could be discerned by examining the following indicators: 
(a) The frequency of Church attendance 
(b) Membership in Catholic organizations 
(c) Feelings of sympathy or hostility towards the 
Church 
(d) Identification with the Catholic World. 40 
The frequency of Church attendance not only gauges the degree 
of integration into the Catholic subculture, but also 
indicates one's psychological attachment to it.41 Similarly, 
several indicators have been employed to measure one's 
attachment to the Communist subculture. They are as follows: 
(a) Membership in a leftist union 
(b) Identification with the working class 
(c) Feelings of sympathy or hostility towards the General 
Confederation of Italian Labour (CGIL) 
(d) Feelings of sympathy or hostility towards the 
U.S.S.R. 
Evidence of the pecline of the Subcultures 
The decline in the strength of the Catholic subculture is 
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apparent when one examines church attendance figures. As Table 
3.2 shows, regular church attendance has drastically declined 
since the mid-1950s when it was roughly 70 per cent. By the 
mid-1970s, church attendance had dropped near the 30 per cent 
mark. With fewer practising Catholics, the Church and its 
affiliated organizations had less influence over voters. 
In addition, figures show that there was a decline in the 
membership of Catholic organizations, which have been inspired 
and sponsored by the Church. 
Table 3.2 
Church Attendance 
(percentage of the adult population) 
1956 69% 
1961 53% 
1968 48% 
1972 36% 
1976 31% 
1980 29% 
1985 29% 
1987 31% 
Source: Robert Leonardi and Douglas Wertman, Italian Christian 
Democracy (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 177. 
For example, Catholic Action (AC), the official lay 
organization of the Church, saw its membership fall from a 
high of 3 million in the mid-1950s to roughly a half-million 
in the mid-1980s. Likewise, the membership of the Italian 
Christian Workers' Association (ACLI) declined from a million 
in the mid-1960s to 538,000 in 1988. There also was a 
noticeable decline in the membership of Coldiretti from 1.9 
million families in 1967 to approximately 1 million families 
in 1986.-42 
Furthermore, the Italian public 
towards the clergy than in the past. 
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is less sympathetic 
In 1968, the mean 
sympathy score for the clergy on a scale of 1 to 100 was 58, 
but by 1981 it fell to 47.43 Moreover, Italians' opposition 
to the Church's involvement in politics grew from 54 per cent 
in 1958 to 67 per cent in 1984. In fact, more than a majority 
of weekly churchgoers feel that the Church should not 
intervene in domestic politics.-44 In short, evidence 
concerning the decline of the Catholic subculture indicates 
that church attendance is down and that practising Catholics, 
who disproportionately support the DC, are less politicized. 
Although not as tangible, there is evidence of a 
deterioration of the Communist subculture. First, there was a 
decline in unionization in the 1980s.4~ The decline in 
unionization occurred in heavy industries which eliminated 
thousands of jobs. It was in these industries that the PCI-
affiliated CGIL had most of its members. The CGIL 
traditionally used its organization to deliver blue collar 
votes to the PCI. However, the decline in unionization reduced 
this pool of potential PCI supporters. 
Moreover, the CGIL's organizational presence was weakest 
in the publ ic sector, one of the fastest growing areas of 
Italy's post-war economy. The public sector is dominated by 
non-left unions, such as the Union of Italian Labour (UIL) and 
the Italian Confederation of Trade Union Workers (CISL). 
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Lastly, in 1987, 30 per cent of union members were pensioners 
up from 15 per cent a decade earlier. 46 This figure is 
problematic for the PCI because it means that fewer young 
workers are becoming unionized, thereby making it difficult to 
revitalize an already flagging Communist subculture. 
In addition, PCI voters are currently less sympathetic 
about the COIL than in the past. In 1968, 46.8 per cent of PCI 
voters were very sympathetic about the COIL, but by 1985 it 
fell to 20.9 per cent."'? Similarly, there was a decline in 
the proportion of PCI voters who were very sympathetic of the 
ex-U.S.S.R. In 1968, 30 per cent of PCI voters were very 
sympathetic of the Soviet Union, but by 1985, this figure was 
below 15 per cent.4S 
Table 3.3 
strength of Party Attachments, 1981-1989 
(as a percentage) 
Very Close 
Fairly Close 
Sympathizer 
Not Close to 
any party 
1981 
20.2 
28.4 
48.9 
2.5 
Nov. 1988 
15.3 
26.1 
32.4 
26.2 
Apr. 1989 
14.2 
23.4 
27.9 
34.3 
Nov. 1989 
11.6 
23.2 
28.9 
36.3 
Sources: Eurobarometer 16 
Eurobarometer 30 (Oct.-Nov. 
II (March-Apr. 1989), pp. 
1989), pp. 245; 650. 
(October 1981), pp. 55-9; 
1988), pp. 745-47; Eurobarometer 
350-59; Eurobarometer 32 (Nov. 
Note: Do not know (OK) responses were excluded from the 
tabulations. The questions asked in each survey were worded as 
follows: Do you consider yourself to be close to any 
particular party? If so, do you feel yourself to be very close 
to this party, fairly close or merely a sympathizer? 
In addition, the decline of both subcultures is 
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manifested in the decrease in the strength of party 
identification. Party identification is defined as an attitude 
of attachment or closeness to a party.49 While party 
identification is different from the concept of appartenenza, 
it is still a reasonable indicator of the strength of a 
subculture since in Italy party identification is a by-product 
of belonging to a subculture. 5o Table 3.3 demonstrates that 
during the 1980s there was a sizeable decrease among those who 
feel very close and fairly close to a party, and among those 
who are merely sympathizers. In contrast, those who do not 
feel close to any party dramatically increased. Hence, it 
appears that voters' party attachments are weakening, which is 
an indication that the subcultures are in decline. 
Finally, the decline of both subcultures manifested 
itself electorally as well. (See Table 1.2, p. 6.) First, 
support for the DC diminished in the white zone where the 
Church had a strong organizational presence. In fact, the DC 
is now strongest in the South where the Church is more 
influential and clientelistic politics is more prevalent. 
Moreover, the PCI/PDS-RC experienced a decline in electoral 
support in the red zone. The decline in support for the DC and 
PCI/PDS-RC reveals the organizational weaknesses of both 
subcultures. 
Reasons for the Decline of the Subcultures 
The economic modernization of Italy led to the diffusion 
of mass communications, increased social and geographical 
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mobi 1 i ty, growing consumer af fluence and the secular i zat ion of 
society. Consequently, there was an erosion in the strength of 
the subcultures and a shift away from collectivism towards 
individualism. 5 l. 
First, the expanded capabilities of mass communications 
led to the decline in the strength of the subcultures, which 
consisted of insular political communities. Previously, both 
subcultures were sheltered from outside sources of 
communication. ThiS, along with the strength of primary groups 
(family, peer groups and school) and organizational networks 
(Church, unions and political parties) in the socialization 
process, fostered a sense of subcultural identity and 
strengthened internal solidarity within the membership, which 
guaranteed the permanence of appartenenza and the maintenance 
of the subcultures. 52 However, mass communications, 
especially television with its pluralist inclinations and its 
supply of competing ideas, penetrated the insulated 
subcultures and eroded their belief structure. Since the 
1970s, the growth of private media has seriously challenged 
diminished the role played by subcultural organizations and 
primary groups in the socialization process. The decline 
of both subcultures also may be attributed to geographical and 
social mobility.53 A 1988 census discovered that one-third 
of Italians live in a locality that is different from their 
birthplace. This process uprooted many people from a familiar 
environment in which their original partisan identity was 
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acquired (usually in the family) and subsequently reinforced 
through personal relations (friends, colleagues and relatives) 
and subcultural organizations. 54 
Lastly, the decline of the subcultures could be 
attributed to growing consumer affluence, leading to a change 
in values. The collective movements of the 19605 and 1970s, 
which emphasized the public good over private interests and 
were at the core of the Catholic and Communist subcultures, 
declined. In their place, voters increasingly espoused such 
values as individualism, materialism, success, and wealth in 
the 1980s. 55 
There are also particular reasons for the decline of the 
subcultures. First, the Catholic subculture declined in 
strength primarily as a result of secularization. Catholicism 
became irrelevant for more Italians. For instance, in 1972, 21 
per cent of Italians felt that Catholicism was irrelevant to 
their lives and by 1980 this nearly doubled to 39 per 
cent.56 Furthermore, a majority of Italians have taken 
secular pOSitions on social matters like divorce and abortion. 
For example, in the 1974 divorce referendum, 59 per cent voted 
to keep the existing divorce law, while in the 1981 abortion 
referendum, 68 per cent voted to maintain the current abortion 
law. These events demonstrated that Catholicism was no longer 
the leading cultural force. 57 
The Catholic subculture declined in strength because the 
Church gradually moved away from direct involvement in Italian 
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politics. A split between conservatives, who favoured a strong 
Church presence in Italian politics, and liberals, who 
favoured a depoliticized Church, weakened the Church's 
influence over Italian society and reduced the Catholic 
subculture's willingness to support the DC. Under Pope Pius 
XII (1939-1958), the Church completely mobilized its resources 
in backing the DC against the PCI. In addition, Catholic 
organizations were ready to be mobilized by the Church during 
election campaigns. However, under the papacy of John XXIII 
(1958-63) and during the first decade of the papacy of Paul VI 
(1963-1978), the Church avoided any direct intervention in 
Italian politics. Since the mid-1970s, the Church has once 
again become involved in Italian politics, but in a more 
limited and less effective fashion than in the 1940s and 
1950s.~8 
Divisions and weaknesses in Catholic organizations also 
led to a decline in the Catholic subculture. Between 1946 and 
1958, the Catholic subculture and the Church gave their 
absolute support to the DC. By the late 1950s/early 1960s, the 
Catholic subculture's backing of the DC was dispassionate and 
more restricted. By the late 1960s/early 1970s, some Catholic 
organizations, in particular ACLI, CISL and AC, halted their 
support of the DC, cr i t ic i zed the party for its rampant 
factionalism and demanded that it reform itself. Despite the 
Church's renewed support for the DC in the 1976 and 1987 
elections, most Catholic organizations have not openly 
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endorsed the DC. Only the Coldiretti and Communion and 
Liberation have openly backed the DC. 59 In short, a divided 
and weakened Catholic subculture, the divisions within the 
Church hierarchy and the secularization of society weakened 
the Church's influence on Italian voters.so 
While secularization weakened the Catholic subculture, 
modernization eroded the base of the Communist subculture. s1 
Growing consumer prosperity debunked the Communist myth that 
the working class could only progress in a Communist 
society.62 The weakening of the trade union movement in the 
1980s also eroded the Communist subculture. First, the FLM 
(the Metal workers union) was forced to sign an agreement to 
layoff 23,000 workers after a bitter 35 day strike at FIAT. 
This event was an omen for the whole labour movement as it 
ushered in an era of industrial restructuring in which 
thousands of i_ndustr ial jobs were eliminated. S:3 Second, the 
defeat of a PCI sponsored referendum to restore wage 
indexation in 1985 seriously divided the labour movement and 
hurt the Communist subculture. Both these events showed that 
the communist subculture was in a malaise. 
The Decline of the Subcultures and Italian Voting Behaviour 
The decline of both subcultures is related to a decline 
in the use of the vote of appartenenza and a s imul taneous 
growth in opinion and exchange votes. The decl ine in the 
appartenenza vote implied that many voters were freed from 
their subcultural bonds and voted for parties for other 
69 
reasons (clientelism or an affinity for their policies). 
Although this argument seemed logical, it was largely untested 
until Renato Mannheimer and Giacomo Sani completed a study on 
both subcultures in 1985. This study demonstrated that the 
subcul tures did not disappear but s till i nf 1 uenced vot i ng 
behaviour in Italy. Moreover, it found that both subcultures 
had slightly declined in size (share of voters who were part 
of the Cathol ic or Communist subculture) and strength (a 
decrease in the number of core members who strongly identify 
with the subculture's beliefs and an increase in peripheral 
members whose subcultural beliefs are tenuous) since the late 
19605. Ei4 
In particular, the study found that 26 per cent of the 
electorate belonged to the Catholic subculture and an equal 
share belongs to the Communist subculture. Furthermore, 8 per 
cent of the electorate belonged to both subcultures and 40 per 
cent belonged to neither subculture.Ei~ This last figure is 
important because, when compared to a 1968 study which found 
only one-third of the electorate did not belong to either 
subculture, it reveals that the non-subcultural group 
increased in absolute terms by seven per cent over 17 
years. EiEi Hence, the decline of both subcultures was gradual 
rather than rapid. In addition, 60 per cent of the DC's 
electoral support came from the Catholic subculture, while 67 
per cent of the PCI I S support was accounted for by the 
Communist subculture. These figures indicated that the 
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subcultures were still important to both parties and provided 
each party with a good-sized electoral base from which to 
build. 
Moreover, the Mannheimer and Sani study seemed to suggest 
that while both the Catholic and Communist subcultures have 
not disappeared, both have slightly declined in size and 
strength. The decline in the size of the Catholic subculture 
is manifested in the sharp decrease in the percentage of 
Italians who regularly attend Church. 
The decline of the Catholic subculture also entailed a 
decrease in the level of commi tment to the ideas of the 
subculture among members. This phenomenon is evident by 
examining the percentage of practising Catholics who support 
the DC. For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s, between 70 and 
75 per cent of practising Catholics voted for the DC, but from 
1983 to 1988 between 57 and 65 per cent of practising 
Catholics supported the DC.6? Specifically, the core members 
of the Catholic subculture (those who solidly identify with 
the ideas of the subculture) were more likely to vote for the 
DC than those on the periphery of the subculture (those who 
are moderately integrated in the subculture and are subjected 
to societal cross pressures).se In fact, 75 per cent of the 
core members supported the DC, while only 40 per cent of the 
peripheral members voted DC.as 
The decline of the Communist subculture involved a 
decrease in the size and strength of the subculture. The 
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decline of the Communist subcul ture was more evident in 
peripheral members than in core members. For instance, 80 per 
cent of the core members of the Communist subculture voted for 
the PCI, while approximately 30 per cent of the peripheral 
members voted for the PCI. 70 
The Shortcomings of the Subcultural Model 
While some maintain that the decline of both subcultures 
directly caused the electoral decline of the DC and PCl, this 
argument is difficult to corroborate quantitatively; but above 
all, it is incomplete and has some flaws. First, the decline 
in the size and strength of both subcultures did not 
necessarily translate into a direct loss of votes for the DC 
and PCI since both parties had a chance to respond to the 
decline of the subcultures by garnering support from other 
sectors of society. 
For instance, the DC increased its share of the secular 
electorate to 33 per cent in 1988 from 15 per cent in 
1968. 71 Although the shrinking supply of practising 
Catholics affected the DC's most important source of electoral 
support, the party replaced part of its religious electorate 
with a secular electorate. 72 In addition, the growing 
meridionalizzazione ("southernization") of the DC vote also 
mitigated the party's electoral losses. In other words, as 
Table 3.4 illustrates the southern share of the DC vote has 
increased in the last twenty years. For instance, in the 1972 
national election, 32.7 per cent of the DC's support came from 
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the South, but in the 1992 election it reached 42.7 per cent. 
Table 3.4 
The Southern Share of the Total Vote of the DC, 1912-92 
(as a percentage of the DC's total vote) 
1912 
1916 
1919 
1983 
1987 
1992 
32.1% 
33.5% 
35.1% 
36.7% 
31.4% 
42.1% 
Sources: Howard Penniman, ed., I taly at the Polls: The 
Parliamentary Elections of 1976 (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterpr ise I nst i tute, 1977), pp. 353-67; Howard Penn iman, 
Italy at the I?olls, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 311-18; Howard Penniman, ed., 
Italy at the Polls, 1983 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1987), pp. 194-201; Corriere della Sera, April 8, 1992, pp. 
16-17. 
LikeWise, the pcr responded to the decline in the size of 
the Communist subculture (primarily due to a decline in 
industrial workers), by broadening its base of support in 
terms of soc ial class (i t attracted more support from the 
middle classes).73 Hence, the party is less reliant on 
industrial workers than in the past, which has mitigated its 
electoral decline. 
Second, the subcultural model only gives a partial 
description of the relationship between voters and 
parties. 74 In particular, it ignores other reasons that 
cause voters to support a party, such as clientelism, an 
affinity for the party's programme or how a party governs. For 
instance, in the red zone, shopkeepers and small businesses 
supported the PCI because it governed responsibly at the local 
level and theiJ:: suppoJ::t was J::ewaJ::ded with 
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peJ::sonal 
favouJ::s. 75 This example indicates that some voteJ::s base 
theiJ:: paJ::ty suppoJ::t on something otheJ:: than subcultural 
identification. 
Lastly, the MannheimeJ:: and Sani study indicates that the 
subcultuJ::es weJ::e still imp0J::tant souJ::ces of electoJ::al suppoJ::t 
fOJ:: both political paJ::ties. In fact, their findings have been 
cOJ::J::oboJ::ated by a study caJ::J::ied out by RobeJ::to CaJ::tocci, who 
concluded that the appartenenza vote was still more widely 
used than the opinion vote. 76 Both the MannheimeJ:: and Sani, 
and Cartocci studies definitely challenge and to an extent 
undermine the idea that the subcultures have declined rapidly. 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that structural changes did not 
adequately explain the electoJ::al decline of the DC and pcr 
because they were supported by a wide array of social classes 
and demogJ::aphic gJ::oups. MOJ::eover, demogJ::aphic factors did not 
invariably benefit one party and hurt another over a period of 
time and it was difficult to predict with any degree of 
certainty how demographic changes will affect each party in 
the future. Lastly I some structural changes were more a 
function of secularization and modernization, two processes 
which are integral to explaining the decline of the Catholic 
and Communist subcultures. 
On the other hand, a study of the decline of the 
subcultures showed that the two subcultures declined in terms 
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of size and strength. The decline of the subcultures, while a 
more useful explanation, did not directly lead to a decline in 
electoral support for the DC and PCI. However, it did weaken 
the loyalty of some appartenenza voters to their subculture, 
allowing them to be more affected by political factors. In 
short, despite the rapid economic, demographic and social 
changes in Italy between mid-1950s and mid-1970s, the hegemony 
of DC and PCI continued until the 1990s. structural changes 
and the decline of the two largest subcultures did not lead 
directly to a decline in electoral support for the DC and PCI, 
but it affected the political environment in which both 
parties have operated since the late 1970s. 
The weakened subcultures and the corresponding increase 
in opinion voting presented both parties with a changed 
electoral environment in the late 1970s, one that was 
essentially more competitive. Given the gradual decline of 
both subcultures, neither party could rely heavily upon them 
as sources of support. Both major parties attempted to adjust 
to the increased competition by attracting non-subcultural 
voters.77 
It is precisely how the DC and pcr responded to their 
changing electoral environments that is the focus of the next 
chapter. In general, it is often the policy choices, electoral 
strategies and governmental performances of parties, and the 
reaction of voters to changes in the political system, that 
affect the electoral support of poli tical parties. 78 The 
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strategies of the DC and PCI, and the resolution of the 
communist question, are two political reasons for the 
electoral decline of both parties. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE ELECTORAL 
DECLINE OF THE DC AND PCI 
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The previous chapter showed that structural changes and 
the decline of the Catholic and Communist subcultures provided 
indirect and incomplete accounts of the electoral decline of 
the DC and PCI. In contrast, this chapter demonstrates that an 
analysis of political factors provides a more complete 
explanation of the decline in electoral support for the DC and 
PC I. The e 1 e c tor a 1 fa 11 0 f bot h par tie sis p r i mar i 1 Y the 
result of political factors, such as the resolution of the 
communist question (the collapse of communism and the end to 
the Cold War and their effect on both parties), and the 
political strategies of both parties. 
The Resolution of the Communist Question and the DC 
The resolution of the communist question is important in 
understanding the electoral decline of the DC because the 
party was the main beneficiary of the anti-communist vote. 
Anti-communism was a key component of the DC'S electoral 
appeal after the Second World War, because the Vatican and the 
U.S. viewed the DC as an anti-Communist bulwark that would 
ensure stability, and protect democratic institutions and 
freedoms. L In the last two decades, anti-communism seemed to 
be a major element in the DC's electoral support only when 
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there was a chance of a PC! sorpasso and/or when the question 
of Communist participation in government was raised. With the 
crisis and collapse of communism, anti-communism diminished in 
importance; hence, the DC lost voter support. The DC 
leadership failed to realize that the collapse of communism 
would not only adversely affect the pcr, but also their own 
party. 
This section describes and analyzes the role of anti-
communism in three elections (1976, 1983 and 1992) in order to 
demonstrate that ant i-communism diminished in importance. 
These three elections were chosen because the degree of anti-
communism varied in each of them. The 1976 election featured 
the strongest anti-communist campaign since the 1948 election. 
In the 1983 election, anti-communism began to diminish in 
importance, while in the 1992 election, anti-communism was not 
even a factor because the Cold War had ended and the pcr no 
longer existed. It is worth remembering that despite the 
decline of the Catholic subculture, its malgoverno, and 
corrupt image, the DC maintained its level of support at 38 
per cent between the 1963 and 1979 elections. This was largely 
due to its anti-communist appeal. 
The 1976 Election 
In order to better understand the significance of anti-
communism in the 1976 national election, it is necessary to 
set the context in which the election occurred. By the mid-
1970s, there were signs that the DC was losing its hegemony in 
82 
the Italian political system. First, the DC lost a Church 
supported referendum to abolish the 1970 divorce law. Most 
observers of Italian politics interpreted the result as 
evidence of profound secularization in Italian society.2 
Second, in the 1975 regional elections, the DC vote £ell to 
35.3 per cent, while the PCI vote increased to 33.4 per cent. 
Hence, the margin between the two parties was only 1.9 per 
cent, which led many to believe that the PCl could surpass the 
DC in the next national election. 3 
During the 1976 election campaign, DC leaders adamantly 
opposed any sort of coalition government with the PCI. Then 
party secretary Amintore Fanfani attacked the PCl in order to 
entice right-wing voters away from the Italian Social Movement 
(MSl) to the DC. In fact, Fanfani called a vote for the MSI "a 
wasted vote." 4 The Church's condemnation of six dissident 
Catholics who ran for the PCI and the admonitions from the 
U. S. about a poss ible PCI government also intensi f ied the 
anti-communist theme during the campaign. 
Despite dire predictions that the DC would lose votes, 
the party maintained its 1972 level of support (38.7 per 
cent). The DC appeared to maintain its support by obtaining 
votes from the MSI, the Italian Liberal Party (PLI) and the 
Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI). ~ Thus, it appeared 
that some of the supporters of these parties voted for the DC 
on the grounds of anti-communism. 
83 
The 1983 Election 
In the 1983 national election campaign, the DC, under 
Cir iaco De Mi ta, conducted a campaign that made the PSI, 
rather than the PCI, its main rival. This change in strategy 
occurred because the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), under 
Bettino Craxi, was becoming a more appealing alternative to 
the DC and PCI. The PSI benefitted from the decline of the 
Catholic and Communist subcul tures and the trend towards 
values such as individualism and material progress in the 
1980s, which it fully embraced and represented. This image of 
the PSI garnered support from the new middle classes 
(professionals, white collar workers and service sector 
employees) .6 I n an attempt to isolate the PS I I De Mi ta 
employed the strategy of bipolarity, which meant that voters 
had a clear choice between the DC, which represented moderate 
groups in Italian society, and the PCI, which represented more 
radical forces. In doing so, De Mita implicitly acknowledged 
that a democratic alternation of power between the DC and the 
PCI was possible. Consequently, the DC's use of anti-communism 
was abandoned. 7 The DC also used the bipolar strategy because 
the DC ended the strategy of confronto (constructive dialogue 
wi th the PCI) and a weak ened PCI abandoned the H istor ic 
Compromise and replaced it with the "democratic alternative". 
The results of the 1983 campaign were a disaster for the 
DC, as its share of vote fell to 32.9 per cent. Most 
attributed the erosion in voter support for the DC to the 
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decline in the importance of anti-communism and to the party's 
negative public image, while the decline of the Catholic 
subculture and the crisis of clientelism were secondary 
factors in the DC's losses. s 
Anti-communism was not an important factor in the 1983 
election for several reasons. First, most polls forecast a 
substantial gap in electoral support between the DC and pcr 
and the threat of a pcr sorpasso was unlikely. Next, De Mita 
downplayed anti-communism, which prompted some secular 
centrist voters, who normally would have voted for the DC on 
anti-communist grounds, to support the small, secular parties 
of the centre including the psr as they had done in the 
past. s Lastly, the pool of ardent anti-communists declined. 
For instance, those who rated the pcr at 20 or lower on a 100 
point scale made up 43 per cent of the electorate in 1968, but 
only 34 per cent in 1985. 10 Hence, there were fewer anti-
communists to mobilize and even if the DC tried to mobilize 
them, this might not have been successful since the 
disenchantment with the party among some centre and right-wing 
voters proved to be a stronger motivating factor than anti-
communism.l.l. Hence, some of them voted for the PRI, PLI and 
MSI, all of which made sizeable electoral gains. In fact, the 
DC's loss of 5.4 per cent roughly equals the sum of the gains 
made by the PRI, PLI and MSI.1.2 
The 1992 Election 
The 1992 election was humorously dubbed the "first free 
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election" in Italy's postwar history because it was the first 
election held in the post-Cold War period. 13 With the 
disappearance of the communist bogeyman, the DC's anti-
communist appeal was rendered impotent. 14 Due to the 
collapse of communism, many voters who previously voted for 
the DC on anti-communist grounds were free to vote for other 
parties that more closely reflected their views or free to 
punish the DC for its malgoverno. 15 In short, the absence of 
anti-communism in this election undermined a vital source of 
electoral support for the DC. 
The Collapse of Communism and its Effects on the pcr 
The crisis and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
partially explains the erosion in support for the PCI. The 
crisis of communism began in the West during the late 1970s, 
manifested in a growing distrust of the former Soviet Union 
and in the belief that communism was not an appropr iate 
solution for the socio-economic problems of the West. This 
growing distrust of communism was due to the treatment of 
Soviet dissidents, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the 
introduction of martial law in Poland. In addition, once 
Gorbachev unveiled glasnost, the failure of the planned 
economy and the general malaise of the Soviet system became 
more readily known in the West and forced the left to reassess 
its views on the economy. The collapse of communism made it 
apparent that communism had failed and was ideologically 
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bankrupt. 
Despite earning the trust of more Italians during the 
period of the Historic Compromise (1972-1980) and its historic 
strappo (break) with Soviet Communism in 1981, when it 
declared that the October Revolution of 1917 was a spent 
force, many Italians still distrusted the PCI in the 1980s. A 
poll conducted in the mid-1980s found that 39 per cent of the 
Italian electorate would never vote for the PCl, making it the 
second most distrusted party after the MSI. 1.6 The decision 
of the pcr ( 1985) to adopt the pol icy of "new 
internationalism", which re-established links with the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), added to the 
public's distrust of the pcr's democratic credentials.1.? 
Many voters saw the PCl's decision as a deviation from its 
programme of political moderation and democratic legitimacy, 
which added to the voter's distrust of the party. The 
governing parties used the 
continue to isolate the 
pcr 's "new international ism" to 
PCl.1.S The policy of "new 
internationalism" was thrown into disarray when the communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
collapsed.log Moreover, reports that the PCI still received 
funds from the CPSU during the 1980s added to the public's 
distrust. 
The collapse of communism also hindered the PCl's appeal 
to youth during the 1980s. In the 1980s, youth showed a 
tendency to prefer single-issue groups and parties (e.g. The 
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Green Party) and eschew ideological movements. Hence, the 
pcr's ideological appeal in the 1980s was not enough to entice 
youth to join the party.20 In fact, in 1977, more than 25 
per cent of the pcr members were under the age of 30, but by 
1988, this figure dropped to 7.2 per cent. 21 Interviews with 
young people discovered that most of them did not know about 
the pcr t s history and associated the word "communist" wi th the 
failed communist regimes in Eastern Europe. 22 
The fai lure on the part of the PCI to attract young 
supporters not only reflects the party's growing unpopularity, 
but is also a function of the ineffectiveness of political 
parties in the socialization process. Ideas conveyed by the 
political parties are often contradicted by messages from the 
media and special interest groups. 
In short, the resolution of the communist question partly 
explains the decline in electoral support for the pcr during 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Although the PCI played by the 
democratic rules of the game, it still maintained a very loose 
association with communism internationally. Many Italians 
viewed this tenuous link with extreme wariness and, in the 
end, they perceived the PCI to be linked to the discredited 
and failed communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. The unwillingness of the PCI to abandon its communist 
heritage allowed its political opponents to continue to 
exclude it from government and prevented it from becoming a 
viable alternative to the DC regime. 23 
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The Political strategy of the DC: The Failure to Reform its 
Negative Public Image and its Reliance upon Negative Factors 
This section aims to demonstrate that the failure of the 
DC to reform its negative publ ic image contr ibuted to its 
electoral decline. 24 Many Italians view the DC as a corrupt, 
divided and power-hungry party, which is in large part due to 
its institutionalized factionalism, partltocrazla, and 
malgoverno. The failure of the party to reform its negative 
image and offer voters a "new DC" forced the DC to rely on 
negative factors such as anti-communism and Catholicism for 
electoral support. (These are cons idered negat i ve factors 
because they do not provide reasons for supporting the DC, but 
give reasons not to support other parties.) 
The DC's negative public image first affected its 
national vote in the 1983 election, in which the anti-
communist and Catholic components of its electorate 
diminished. In fact, the party's public image as a competent 
governing party began to rapidly deteriorate as early as the 
late 19605. Surveys conducted between 1967 and 1976 revealed 
that the Italian electorate viewed the DC as the most 
dishonest, archaic and incompetent party. 25 A 1986 study 
found that if the DC went into opposition, 38 per cent of the 
electorate believed that corruption would decrease and 42 per 
cent felt that government would operate better.26 These 
surveys thus highlighted growing public dissatisfaction with 
the DC's performance in government. However, this did not 
immediately lead to a decline in its electoral support because 
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the Catholic and anti-communist vote, especially the latter, 
mitigated the adverse effects of the public's dissatisfaction 
with the DC. 
Most analysts attribute the public's eroding confidence 
in the DC as a governing party to the well-founded belief that 
there is widespread corruption in the Italian political 
system. The DC has been involved in many scandals in the last 
three decades. In the mid-1970s, it was involved in a number 
of scandals, while in the early 1980s the DC was tainted by 
the P2 scandal which involved the Masonic Lodge's infiltration 
into the Italian political system. Today, the DC is implicated 
in the tangentopoli (city of bribes) scandal that has led to 
charges against high ranking DC politicians like De Mita. In 
addition, some key party figures, like Giulio Andreotti, are 
under investigation for collusion with organized crime. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the public viewed the DC as a "guarantor of 
Italian democracy" and "the godfather of the economic 
miracle", but today many Italians believe the DC is a corrupt 
party, which cannot resolve the ser ious problems plaguing 
Italy. 
The DC's Attempts at Internal Reform 
In response to its growing negative public image, the DC 
attempted to reform itself. The May 1974 divorce referendum 
and the 1975 regional elections forced the DC to understand 
that its popular image was deteriorating and that it could 
poss ibly lose power.:';:7 First, the DC leadership replaced 
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Fanfan i, who symbol i zed the 0 ld, corrupt DC, wi th Ben igno 
Zaccagnini, who was from the party's left-wing and considered 
honest and clean. 
Zaccagnini then set out to reform the party under the 
slogans of r innovamento (renewal) and the "new DC". Zaccagnini 
wanted to end political corruption by limiting the power of 
the factions, to revitalize the party and increase 
participation among the rank and file.~s Zaccagnini's 
attacks on factional leaders (whom he called "tribal 
chieftains") engendered enthusiasm among the rank and file and 
he was able to introduce some minor reforms. In an attempt to 
reach out to voters who were not party members nor members of 
a Catholic organization, yearly Peste dell f Amicizia 
(Friendship Festivals) were organized, similar to the pcr's 
festivals. Zaccagnini also reformed membership practices by 
making it more difficult to inflate membership figures and by 
limiting the power of local sections to prevent a new member 
of an opposing faction from joining the party.29 
Zaccagnini's attempts at party renewal failed for several 
reasons. First, he was not able to wrest a considerable amount 
of power from the factions. Although centre and right-wing 
factional leaders supported party reform, many only wanted to 
make cosmetic changes in order to improve the party's public 
standing without having to yield their power. Next, the degree 
of active participation among the membership did not increase. 
Third, between 1978 and 1980, the DC was more concerned about 
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developing a strategy towards the pcr than wi th reform. 
Furthermore, the DC maintained its level of support at 38 per 
cent in the 1976 and 1979 elections, which made many DC 
leaders indifferent towards the reform of the party. Hence, 
reforms were placed on the back burner. 3o Lastly, the DC was 
not only unable to convince the general public that it was 
undertaking credible reforms, but it failed to persuade many 
of its own party members. For instance, a March 1977 survey of 
1001 DC members found that 56.7 per cent noticed changes in 
the party, while 32.3 per cent did not notice any changes. Of 
those that noticed changes, only 31.5 per cent thought these 
changes were positive, while 25.2 per cent perceived them to 
be negat i ve . :31. 
The renewal of the DC once again became an important 
issue in the early 1980s as the party's grass roots, young DC 
parliamentarians, and Catholic organizations urged the DC to 
renew itself. Moreover, the DC lost control of the pr ime 
ministership in June 1981 after holding this position for 36 
years, and it was losing considerable support in the large 
urban centres. Lastly, the election of De Mita, who is from 
the party's left-wing, as DC secretary once again placed the 
renewal of the party a top priority.32 
De Mita wanted to clean up the tarnished image of the DC 
through a dual policy of rinnovamento (renewal) and rigore 
(austerity).33 Rinnovamento entailed reconstructuring the 
party organization in the large cities, limiting the power of 
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the factions, and replacing incumbents with people from 
Catholic organizations and the business community. Rigore, on 
the other hand, involved a shift in the DC's economic policy, 
in particular, a reduction in state intervention. The policies 
of rinnovaraento and rigore were related since reducing state 
intervention in the economy could limi t the power of the 
factions within the DC. De Mita wanted to change the DC from 
a brokerage party to a moderate conservative party. De Mita 
believed that the DC's role as broker only resulted in 
ambiguous policies and programmes, and immobilism. He wanted 
the "new DC" to be a party of clear ideas and chOices, which 
attracted contemporary, knowledgeable opinion voters rather 
than exchange and appartenenza voters. 
Nonetheless, the DC's attempts to reform itself ran into 
opposition from many DC faction leaders who charged De Mita 
with abandoning the DC's traditional role as broker of various 
socio-economic groups. They claimed that the DC had been 
Italy's leading party because of its catch-all party 
status. 34 In fact, opponents of the rigore policy warned 
that the DC would lose support among traditional sectors of 
its electorate, especially exchange voters, found primarily in 
the South. 
The effectiveness of De Mita's reforms was first tested 
in the 1983 national election. The DC campaigned to end 
clientelism and also fought the election on the policies of 
rigore and rinnovaraento. 3 1!3 The DC only obtained 32.9 per 
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cent of the vote, a 5.4 per cent decline from the 1979 
election. The heaviest losses were recorded in the North, 
while smaller losses were registered in the South. Many 
northern voters supported the small secular parties of the 
centre and the MSI because, unl ike the DC, they were not 
tainted by scandal and corruption. Hence, many voters viewed 
the DC as the "old DC" of corruption and poor government 
rather than the "new DC" of honesty and austerity.:lI6 
In contrast with the North, some have argued that the DC 
lost votes in the South because its programme of r 1 gore 
angered many of the party's southern exchange voters.37 The 
DC'S share of the vote in the South was 41.2 per cent in 1972 
and 42.9 per cent in 1979, but in 1983 it fell to 37.3 per 
cent.3S Clientelistic voters and other socioeconomic 
categories threatened by rigore voted against the "new DC" of 
De Mi ta. 39 The DC also decl ined in support in the South 
because it lost control of the Ministry for the South, a vital 
source of patronage, to the PSI. The recession of the early 
1980s reduced the public resources available for clientelism, 
but its imul taneously increased the South's reI iance upon 
government entitlements and thereby bolstered those 
representatives and parties that had access to patronage. 40 
The party that appeared to benefit from the southern 
clientelistic vote in the 1983 election was the PSI, which 
increased its share of the vote in South by 2.5 per cent.4~ 
In short, the "new DC" proposed by De Mita found itself in a 
94 
dilemma because it risked losing the support of southern 
exchange voters as it attempted to garner the support of more 
northern opinion voters. 
The results of the 1983 election weakened De Mita's 
position within the party, but he managed to retain his 
position as party secretary and continued to try to reform the 
party. His efforts appeared to be effective when the DC 
obtained 35 per cent of the vote in the 1985 regional 
elections and 34.3 per cent in the 1987 national election. 
This was due in part to the revitalization of party 
organizations in Italy's ten largest cities and because the DC 
was not plagued by any major scandals. 42 
Table 4.1 
voters' Estimates of the Degree of Change 
Resulting from the DC's Reforms 
Little/No change 
A Fair amount 
A Great Deal 
Don't Know 
DC Voters 
49% 
33% 
6% 
12% 
Voters in general 
64% 
20% 
3% 
13% 
Source: Douglas A. Wertman, "DC Congress: the End of 
Factions?" in Italian Politics: A Review. Volume 2, eds. R. 
Leonardi et al. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), p. 57. 
However, most of the DC's gains can be attributed to 
traditional sources of support such as anti-communism and 
Catholicism; the latter was bolstered by the Church 
hierarchy's acti ve involvement in the campaign, the DC's 
renewed links with the Catholic organizations, such as 
Communione e Liberazione (CL-Communion and Liberation), and 
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strong economic growth, largely the result of a flourishing 
international economy.43 
Nonetheless, De Mita's attempts to reform the party, like 
Zaccagnini's failed. 44 First, as Table 4.1 reveals, he 
failed to convince DC supporters let alone voters, that 
positive reform had occurred within the DC. Second, as was 
true with Zaccagnini, the DC's relative success at the polls 
undermined De Mita's efforts to reform the party any 
further.4~ The DC was no longer threatened by a PCl sorpasso 
and its status as Italy's party of the relative majority was 
no longer in jeopardy. Thus, the need to reform the party 
declined in importance. These developments engendered an 
attitude of complacency within the DC leadership. 
Third, De Mita was also responsible for the end of the 
reforms. He used factional criteria to allocate cabinet 
pos i tions, which angered many reformers and prompted the 
Zaccagnini faction to withdraw its support of De Mita. Next, 
he accepted the position of prime minister in April 1988, 
which, because of the DC's unwr i tten rule oppos ing "double 
appointment" (no party figure can hold two positions at once) 
prevented him from keeping his position as party 
secretary.46 
At the DC's 18th party Congress in 1989, De Mita was 
replaced by Arnaldo Forlani. The election of Forlani marked an 
end to De Mita's reforms, but more importantly, it represented 
a return to the "old DC", Forlani and his supporters reverted 
96 
to the DC's catch-all party status and they showed a 
willingness to rely upon negative factors such as anti-
communism and Catholicism. 47 Hence, any serious reforms were 
shelved and the DC was once again content to simply govern. 
However, by 1991 calls for party renewal began to emerge 
again from two promine~t Christian Democrats, Francesco 
Cossiga, the President of the Republic and Mario Segni, the 
leader of a minority reform faction.·u In September 1991, 
Cossiga chided the DC for its defence of partitocrazia. A 
groundswell of opposition and protest against partitocrazia 
gathered strength in the North, where many voters were angry 
wi th the government's high taxes, profl igate spend ing on 
southern development and incompetence. The Northern League 
(Lega Nord-LN) led the anti-partitocrazia movement, which 
essentially attacked the Rome-centred and southern-controlled 
poli tical class. 4. Cossiga warned that, if the DC did not 
genuinely reform itself and address Italy's problems, it would 
be doomed to extinction. Segni, on the other hand, criticized 
the DC's hesitancy about policy changes and electoral 
reform. &0 Meanwhile, in the South, the DC was tarnished by 
its alleged collusion with the Mafia. 
Observers of the April 1992 election attributed the DC's 
losses to the virtual disappearance of anti-communism, the 
delayed effects of secularization, and the public's animosity 
towards partitocrazia. Of all these factors, the anti-
partitocrazia movement was the most important in explaining 
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the DC's decline of 4.6 per cent.51 The DC's losses were the 
heaviest in northern and north-central Italy, while, in the 
South, the DC declined slightly.52 The "southernization" of 
the DC vote suggests that the DC is being punished by voters 
in the North because of its malgoverno, but, in the South, it 
is maintaining its level of support because it still controls 
a good portion of the patronage network. 
The fact that the DC's negative public image became an 
important factor in the 1992 election is linked to the 
resolution of the communist question. The DC leadership did 
not completely grasp that the collapse of communism would rob 
the party of one of its most important sources of support 
(anti-communism). Moreover, the leadership failed to realize 
that it needed to replace declining sources of support (anti-
communism and Catholicism) with new sources of support. With 
the communist question resolved, other issues such as the DC's 
negative public image became important. Essentially, the DC 
leadership failed to take advantage of the reformist space 
vacated by the pcr in the late 1980s. By not reforming itself 
and offer ing voters posi ti ve reasons to support it, the 
negat i ve image of the DC adversely affected its electoral 
support. 
The Political strategies of the PCl: Undermining its 
Credibility as a Reformist Alternative 
This section focuses on the political strategies of the 
pcr since the 1970s. An examination of these strategies will 
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reveal that the pcr failed to become a credible alternative to 
the DC because it lacked a clear political programme in the 
last twenty years.!53 This is the case because the pcr and 
its successor, the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) failed 
to resolve a longstanding division between the left and right 
wings of party. Their lack of a clear political programme 
resulted in a decline in voter support for the pcr and PDS. 
In particular, while the "Historic Compromise" strategy 
of the 1970s, and more specifically the pcr's involvement in 
the governments of national solidarity (1977-1979), may have 
won the support of some centre-left voters, they alienated 
many of the party's left-wing opposed to cooperation with the 
DC. Second, the "democratic alternative" strategy of the 
1980s, which attempted to stop the pcr's decline in support 
among left-wing voters, alienated many centre-left voters it 
acquired in the mid-1970s.!54 These two strategies, in 
effect, made many progressive voters sceptical of the party's 
willingness and ability to change the system, undermined its 
credibility as an alternative to the DC, and ultimately led to 
a decline in support for the pcr. 
While the ambiguous strategies of the pcr resulted in 
electoral losses, they probably prevented a rapid decline in 
support for the party and its successor, the PDS. In contrast, 
the French and Portuguese Communist Parties followed a 
dogmatic Marxist-Leninist stance, which resulted in a rapid 
erosion of their voter support during the 1980s.!5!5 
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The strategy of the Historic Compromise 
In the 1979 election, the PCI fell from its all-time high 
of 34.4 per cent to 30.4 per cent. Between 1946 and 1976 the 
PCI steadily gained votes, so the 1979 election marked the 
first time that the pcr lost electoral support. The losses 
incurred in this election were partly the outcome of the PCI's 
"Historic Compromise" strategy, which was first articulated by 
party secretary Enrico Berlinguer in 1972. 
The "Historic Compromise" had two goals. First, through 
cooperation with the DC, the pcr aimed to bring about 
significant change in Italy and stabilize the socioeconomic 
situation.~6 Second, the pcr tried to legitimize itself as 
a governing party and eventually push the DC into 
opposition. 57 The Historic Compromise appealed to the 
party's left-wing because of its emphasis on change and it 
pleased the right-wing because it would permi t the pcr to 
improve its image as a party of government. r n br i ef, the 
Historic Compromise represented a continuation of the pcr's 
ideological moderation and demonstrated Berlinguer's ability 
to balance the interests of both wings of the party. 
The pcr adopted the Historic Compromise strategy because 
of the critical situation in which the left found itself in 
the early 1970s. The period of intense social mobilization in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s (student demonstrations and 
labour militancy), provoked a backlash from conservative 
elements in Italian society. Right-wing terrorist bombings, 
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which began in 1969 and continued in the early 1970s (known as 
the "strategy of tension"), violent disturbances organized by 
the MSI in southern Italy, and the MSI's strong showing in the 
South during the 1972 election, put the left and, in 
particular, the PCl, on the defensive. Most PCI strategists 
likened this backlash against profound social change to the 
rise of fascism in the early 1920s.!58 The PCI's 
interpretation of events reveals that the party's thinking was 
significantly shaped by the fascist experience. 59 
The PCI believed that only a concerted effort amongst 
anti-fascist political forces would protect democracy and 
assure significant change. Moreover, the PCI leadership 
postulated that if a leftist government came to power in Italy 
without the cooperation of the DC, that it would be overthrown 
by a mi 1 i tary coup 1 ike Allende's leftist government in 
Chile. so Finally, the PCI also realized that if it ever 
wanted to oust the DC from power it would have to obtain more 
support from centre-left voters who usually voted for the PSI, 
PSDl and PRI. 
In addition to a fear of a right-wing backlash, in 1973 
Ber1inguer assumed that Italian political alignments were 
stable and unlikely to change. Nevertheless, circumstances 
began to change after 1973. First, the 1974 divorce referendum 
revealed that Italy was secularized. Next, the PCI made 
substantial gains in the 1975 regional and municipal 
elections, coming within two percentage points of the DC. It 
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appeared that voters were beginning to see the pcr as an 
appealing alternative to an exceedingly corrupt and ageing DC, 
especially among young people and some progressive elements in 
society.e1 Surveys between 1967 and 1976 revealed that the 
pcr scored the highest of all the major parties in terms of 
honesty, good ideas, unity, youthfulness, modernity and 
representat i veness. 62 Thus, the Histor ic Compromise, wh ich 
was primarily defensive, appeared inappropriate for a 
situation which witnessed the electoral growth of the 
left.E53 
Despite the changes, the PCl continued with the Historic 
Compromise because it interpreted its success at the polls in 
the 1976 national election as an endorsement of the 
strategy.E54 After the 1976 election, the pcr supported the 
governments of national solidarity (1976-1979). Although the 
pcr eventually entered the "government majority" (the pcr no 
longer abstained, but voted in favour of the DC-led 
government) in 1978, the DC prevented the pcr from obtaining 
any cabinet positions because this would have given the PC! a 
chance to legitimize itself as a governing party. As a part of 
the government majority, the PC! supported economic austerity 
measures which hurt industr ial workers, but achieved few 
substantive reforms as compensation. In the end, with pressure 
mounting on the pcr from its rank and file and trade unions, 
it withdrew its support from government, which led to early 
elections in 1979. 
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The Historic Compromise failed to achieve what it set out 
to accomplish. It did not effect considerable change, which 
angered left-wing supporters; and it failed to legitimize the 
PCl as a national governing party although it may have 
increased its democratic credibility. The Historic Compromise 
failed for two reasons. First, the PCI relied excessively upon 
the goodwill of the DC and, in particular, Aldo Moro, the DC 
statesman and chief architect of the nat ional sol idar i ty 
governments, who was assassinated by the Red Brigades in 1978. 
Moro was less hostile to the idea of the PCI fully entering 
government than many other DC leaders. In general, the DC 
outmanoeuvred the PCI by barring it from government, but still 
using its support of the government to stabilize the social 
and political situation. 55 Second, the Historic Compromise 
saw the pcr move from the left to the centre-left at a time 
when the party system was still tripolar in nature (left, 
right and centre). The pcr's move towards the centre always 
carried the risk of losing the support of their left-Wing 
voters who demanded radical change, which is precisely what 
happened. 
The Historic Compromise led to a decline in support for 
the pcr in the 1979 election because its cooperation with the 
DC angered party militants, left-wing unionists, radical youth 
and new opinion voters who wanted the pcr to remove the DC 
from office. 56 These groups supported the PCl in the mid-
1970s because "the pcr became the reference point for all 
103 
those groups demanding change, or demanding an overhaul of the 
system."S7 On the other hand, these groups considered the DC 
as an obstacle to change. So, when the pcr supported the DC, 
the pcr came under attack for its moderation and lost some of 
the support of these groups. 
rn government, the pcr was subordinated to the DC and was 
reluctant to make excessive demands upon the DC because it 
wanted to portray itself as a responsible party and was more 
concerned with legitimizing itself as a governing party rather 
than effecting substantial change. sa The Radical Party 
(PRad), a left-libertarian party promoting significant social 
reform, criticized the pcr for its involvement in the 
partitocrazia. Hence, some left-wing voters believed that the 
pcr had become like the traditional governing parties. 59 For 
many leftist voters in the 1970s, "the PCI's image and its 
credibility as the reforming party were tarnished."70 
Consequently, the pcr lost support in the 1979 election and 
most of it went to the PRad, which saw its vote increase from 
1.1 per cent in 1976 to 3.5 per cent in 1979. The decline in 
support for the PCl opened up a reformist space on the left, 
which was filled by the PRad and smaller leftist parties.7~ 
The PCl also failed to hold onto the gains it made in the 
South in the 1976 election because it was not able to meet the 
demands of southern exchange voters. This occurred because few 
public resources were available during the economic malaise of 
the 1970s and most of them were controlled by the DC. 
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Moreover, the PC! organization was not prepared for patronage 
politics. 72 
In short, the Historic Compromise strategy seemed to 
focus the PCI's efforts on legitimizing itself as a governing 
party, which appealed to centre-left voters, but angered many 
leftist supporters who wanted radical change. The party's 
inability and unwillingness to effect substantial reform in 
the 1970s created a lasting impression among leftist 
supporters that the PCI was no longer a reformist force, and 
this translated into a loss of votes for the PCI. Moreover, 
since the PCI never obtained cabinet posts, it never really 
proved to the Italian public that it could run the country 
responsibly. Thus, moderate centre-left voters were no more 
likely to support the pcr than before the Historic Compromise. 
Tbe Democratic Alternative 
In 1980, the PCI advanced the strategy of the "democratic 
alternative" in an attempt to regain votes and credibility 
among disillusioned leftist voters.73 The strategy involved 
the creation of a coalition, which included progressive 
parties and radical social movements, but excluded the DC. The 
PCl's main partner in a democratic alternative would be the 
PSI. However, any possible coalition with the PSI was 
unrealistic because the period in which the PSI advocated a 
government of the left had ended in 1976 when Craxi was 
elected party secretary. Craxi was the leader of the PSI's 
"autonomy" faction, which favoured independence from the 
105 
PCI.74 The PSI re-entered government in 1980 and became 
increasingly critical of the PCl, which made the relationship 
between the two parties more corrosive. Under Craxi, the PSI 
sought to isolate the PCl and supplant it as the dominant 
party on the left in much the same manner that Francois 
Mitterrand's French Socialist Party isolated and supplanted 
the French Communist Party.75 
Although the democratic alternative was unrealistic in 
some regards, the PCI did not have many options available. 
Most elements within the DC and PCl were not willing to 
support another Historic Compromise, ruling out cooperation 
with the DC. In order to avoid political isolation, the PCI 
was compelled to adopt this strategy with the hope that it 
could attract the support of smaller progressive parties and 
become the focal point of opposition to the DC. Lastly, the 
PCI itself was quite unsure of its pol i tical goals, so an 
ambiguous political strategy like the democratic alternative 
was quite appropriate. 76 
In the 1983 election, the PCl lost a half per cent of its 
support, but it failed to capitalize on the DC's electoral 
losses I suggesting that it was unable to gather moderate 
centre-left voters who supported the PS I. Whi Ie the pcr' s 
democratic leg! timacy was not an important concern amongst 
these voters, the ambiguity of the democratic alternative made 
them wary of its ability to govern. 
The pct was expected to do well in the 1987 election due 
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to the collapse of the pentapartito (five-party) coalition 
that supported the Craxi government for three and half years, 
and because of the worsening relations between the DC and 
PSI.77 But the PCI was also intensely cr i tical of the PSI 
and Craxi between 1983 and 1986, which divided the working 
class and cost it support among the middle classes. The pcr 
declined from 29.9 per cent in 1983 to 26.6 per cent in the 
1987 national election. 
During the campaign, the pcr adhered to the democratic 
alternative and, like the 1983 election, the PCI leadership 
was vague about the parties that would be in the alternative. 
Part of this ambiguity may be attributed to the hostile 
positions of the PRad and PSI. Although such ambiguity allowed 
for more f lexibi 1 i ty wi th regard to the format ion of an 
alliance, it also disadvantaged the PCI since voters knew very 
little about the party's intended policies or programme. 7S 
In addition, the PCI leadership followed a centrist path 
as it tried to reconcile the left and right wings of the 
party. It appealed to the left by allowing independent 
candidates from various social movements (environmental, 
feminist and pacifist) to run on party lists, while the PCI's 
overtures to the PSI about a possible alliance pleased the 
right wing. Nevertheless, the PCI's strategy of accommodation 
resulted in a heterogeneous selection of candidates, some of 
whom held very divergent and irreconcilable views. For 
instance, the pcr slate of candidates contained both anti and 
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pro nuclearists. 79 The pcr's attempt to appeal to both 
leftist and centre-left voters made many of these voters 
reluctant to support the pcr because they were uncertain about 
what the party represented. Thus, the PCI lost votes, some of 
which went to the psr (+2.9 per cent from 1983)90, 
Proletarian Democracy (DP) (+0.2 per cent) and the PRad (+0.4 
per cent). The pcr also was unable to capture votes that went 
to the Greens (2.5 per cent). 
The pcr's losses were heaviest in large urban cities like 
Milan and Turin. The loss of support in Milan indicated that 
the party failed to mobilize the new middle-class electorate, 
while its decline in the working class areas of Turin (Settimo 
Torinese) and Milan (Sesto San Giovanni) occurred because of 
industrial restructuring. The party also fared poorly among 
young voters (those under the age of 25). 
In short, many centre-left voters were wary of supporting 
the pcr because its democratic alternative strategy contained 
overtures to the radical left. But more importantly, it 
demonstrated that the tens ions between the left and right 
wings of the PCI were unresolved, which undermined the party's 
image as a credible reformist alternative to the DC.s~ 
The Dissolution of the PCl and the Formation of the PDB 
To deal with the pcr's malaise, the party elected Achille 
Occhetto as party secretary in 1988. Occhetto launched a 
"refoundation" of the pcr in March 1989, which included an end 
to democratic centralism. Open discussion, voting, and the 
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existence of majorities and minorities would be allowed in 
order to resolve the constant equivocation in the party 
programme. 
politics. 
Next, the PCI declared an end to consociational 
In other words, the pcr would act as a true 
opposition and portray itself as the alternative to the DC. 
The alternative would be based on a clear programme of 
institutional reform (including electoral reform), workplace 
democracy and support for the demands of "progressive" social 
movements (environmentalism, feminism and pacificism). Lastly, 
the document indicated that democracy was the only road to 
socialism, a statement which affirmed the party's democratic 
credentials. s2 
Although Occhetto renewed the pcr's programme, he failed 
to specify the parties that would be a part of a democratic 
alternative. The right wing of the party was not pleased with 
the document because it did not explicitly state that the pcr 
would form an alliance with the psr. Moreover, it seemed that 
the democratic alternative ranged from a "go-it-alone" 
strategy to an alliance that included radical social 
movements. Thus, the per's strategy still remained vague. S3 
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe compelled 
Occhetto to accelerate the per's renewal. In November 1989, he 
proposed the dissolution of the pcr and the formation of new 
political party of the left. Like previous strategies, the 
objective of Occhetto's proposals was to move the per from 
opposition to government. S4 However, Occhetto's proposals 
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encountered resistance from the Cossutiani (the pro-Soviet 
wing led by Armando Cossutta), the leftist Ingraiani and from 
the centrist Berlingueriani. 
Occhetto I s proposals were opposed by a third of the 
party's members who favoured a refounding of the pcr (keeping 
the party name, but still reforming the party) at the 
twentieth party congress. Nevertheless, the pcr was dissolved 
at the twentieth congress in January 1991 and the Democratic 
Party of the Left (PDS) was born. The formation of the PDS led 
to the departure of the Cossutiani from the party. Cossutta 
formed the Communist Refoundation (RC), which was able to 
obtain support from some of the left-wing of the PDS and 
absorbed the DP which obtained 1.7 per cent of the vote in 
1987. 
On the other hand, most of the PDS I S left-wing, who 
called themselves the "Democratic Communists", remained in the 
PDS to try to give the party a radical bent.a~ The PDS also 
contained a centrist faction led by Occhetto and a right wing 
faction called the riformisti. With these divisions, the party 
failed to develop a clear programme heading into the 1992 
election. This division was apparent at the founding congress 
of the PDS, which was dominated by one issue, the Gulf War. In 
a move to placate the left wing, Occhetto called for a cease-
fire and an immediate withdrawal of Italian troops from the 
Gulf. This move angered the riformisti because it worsened 
relations with the PSI, which favoured armed intervention. 
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In the 1992 election, the PDS only garnered 16.1 per cent 
of the vote and, when combined with the RC vote (minus the DP 
vote of 1987), the ex-PCI received roughly 20.0 per cent of 
the vote. ss As in previous elections, the ex-PCr's support 
plummeted because many voters did not feel the PDS was a 
credible 
dissolved 
alternative. a7 One 
the PCI and formed 
of 
the 
the reasons Occhetto 
PDS was to r eso 1 ve the 
division between the left and right wings of the party, but 
this did not happen. The left-right split that badgered the 
pcr plagued the PDS and resulted once again in ambiguous 
policies. as 
Many voters distrusted the PDS because of the presence of 
a radical left-wing faction within the party. After the PDS's 
acquiescence to the left-wing on the Gulf War, some voters 
feared that the left-wing would have considerable influence 
over the leadership. In fact, 32 per cent of the party's 
National Council is composed of members who belong to left-
wing factions (Democratic Communists-27% and Reformers and 
Oppositionists-5%).89 Many other parties and voters viewed 
the PDS's stance on the Gulf War as irresponsible and raised 
questions about the party's commitment to European security in 
general. 90 
In short, the pcr (PDS) has lost electoral support since 
1976 because it failed to develop a coherent political 
programme. 9 J.. Instead, it tr ied to cover up its internal 
divisions by accommodating many divergent points of view into 
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one ambivalent political line, which made many voters wary of 
the party. While the dissolution of the PCI and the 
establishment of the PDS allayed fears about its commitment to 
democracy, many voters remained unwilling to vote for a party 
that did not articulate a clear programme in the last twenty 
years. 
A Critique of the Political strategy Model 
There is one major problem with this model. First, it may 
have been very difficult for either party to have developed a 
coherent strategy that dealt could simultaneously address the 
different needs of the South and North. Bridging the social, 
economic and political differences between the North and South 
seemed paradoxical for both parties. In the case of the DC, 
the policy of rigore hurt the DC in the South, but did not 
earn support for the party in the North. Had the party 
abandoned clientelistic politics altogether, it may have lost 
more votes in the South. Instead, the DC's electoral decline 
in the South was much slower than in other parts of the 
country largely as a result of clientelism. 
In the case of the PCI, the party may have maintained an 
ambiguous stance because if it moved too far towards the 
centre, it would have lost more votes on the left and if moved 
to the left, it would have lost the support of centr ist 
voters. In short, the realities of Italian society may have 
precluded both parties from adopting any other strategies than 
the ones employed. 
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Nonetheless, the vast disparities between the North and 
South are not as intractable as previously mentioned. One 
study challenged the conventional view that clientelism is the 
inevitable mode of political behaviour in southern Italy.92 
Southerners along wi th northerners are presently showing their 
disapproval of the DC's clientelism and corruption. In 
addition, a move towards the centre on the part of the pcr may 
have benefitted the party since there was less ideological 
polarization beginning in the late 19705. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined several poli tical factors that 
explain the electoral decline of the DC and pcr since the late 
1970s. First, support for the DC declined because the 
resolution of the communist question rendered the DC's anti-
communist vote obsolete. Second, the collapse of communism led 
to a decline the pcr's vote because many voters still 
associated the PCI with the failure of communism abroad. Next, 
the DC leadership failed to reform the party's negative public 
image and continued to rely on negative factors, which 
resulted in a decline in its share of the vote. Lastly, The 
PCI (PDS) lost electoral support because many voters did not 
view it as a credible alternative, which largely resulted from 
its ambiguous strategies and policies. 
The next chapter examines the recent changes to the party 
system. They include party fragmentation, the decline in 
traditional party support and the emergence of new political 
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par ties such as the Lega Nord (Northern League-LN) and the 
Rete (Network), which are challenging the DC and PCI, for 
national power. The chapter also addresses the question of 
whether the North-South split and the centre-periphery 
cleavage are becoming more significant in the Italian party 
system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RECENT CHANGES IN THE ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM 
Chapters three and four focused on societal and political 
factors that contributed to the electoral decline of the pcr and 
DC. This chapter examines recent changes in the Italian party 
system. These changes include a steady increase in party 
fragmentation, a combined decrease in the share of the vote for 
the traditional political parties (DC, PCI/PDS, the Italian 
Socialist Party (PSI), the Italian Social Movement (MSI), the 
Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Italian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDI) and the Italian Liberal Party (PLI», and an 
increase in support for new political parties such as the Rete 
(The Network) and the Lega Nord (The Northern League-LN). 
This chapter contains three main sections. First, a 
descr iption of the changes in the party system is provided. 
Next, new political movements such as, the Rete and the LN are 
investigated. The study of the LN involves a detailed 
examination of the composition of its electorate and an analysis 
of the party's growing electoral appeal. Lastly, the emergence 
of new political movements also indicates that two cleavages are 
becoming important: the North-South spl it and the modern! ty-
tradition dichotomy, which is also known as the centre-periphery 
or the state-civil society cleavage. 
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Party Fragmentation and the Crisis of the Traditional Parties 
Table 5.1 shows that party fragmentation has increased 
since the mid-1970s. Not only are there more parties competing 
in national elections, but there are more parties gaining 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies. Although party 
fragmentation in the Italian party system should not come as a 
s urpr is e to most students of I tal i an pol it ics, the fact that 
fragmentation increased since the mid-1970s is important. 1 
Table 5.1 reveals that the number of parties represented in the 
Chamber of Deputies nearly doubled over a twenty year period 
(1972-1992). 
1972 
9 
Table 5.1 
The Number of Parties with Seats in 
The Chamber of Deputies 
1976 
11 
1979 
12 
1983 
13 
1987 
14 
1992 
16 
Source: Elections Since 1945: A Worldwide Reference Compendium, 
(Chicago: st. James Press, 1989), p. 180. 
Vincent Della Sala and David Hine, "The Italian General 
Election of 1992," Electoral Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec. 
1992), p. 364. 
An examination of party fragmentation is important for two 
reasons. First, an increase in the number of parties in the 
lower house makes it more difficult to form stable coalition 
governments since more parties are needed to form governments 
with workable parliamentary majorities. In addition, an increase 
in party fragmentation indicates that the Italian electorate as 
a whole has not yet rallied around an alternative that could 
replace the DC as the plurality party. 
Another changing aspect of the Italian party system is the 
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decline in electoral support for the traditional political 
parties. For instance, in 1976, the traditional parties obtained 
95.0 per cent of the votes cast, but in 1992, this figure fell 
to 74.7 per cent. Most of the votes that the traditional parties 
lost have gone to new political parties such as LN, Rete, the 
Radical Party (PRad), the Green Party, Proletarian Democracy 
(DP) and Communist Refoundation (RC). As Table 5.2 indicates, 
new political parties increased their share of the total vote 
ten-fold. 
Table 5.2 
Percentage Share of the Vote Obtained by 
New Political Parties in Italy, 1976-1992 
1976 
2.7 
(Percentage of eli9ible votes cast) 
1979 
6.8 
1983 
6.4 
1987 
10.1 
1992 
25.3 
Source: Elections since 1945: A Worldwide R~ference Compendium 
(Chicago: st. James Press, 1989), p. 180. 
Vincent Della Sala and David Hine, "The Italian General 
Election of 1992," Electoral studies, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec. 
1992), p. 364. 
The dramatic increase in the share of the vote obtained by 
new parties since 1983 may reflect the public's dissatisfaction 
with the government's corruption, clientelism and inefficiency. 
It also may reflect the electorate's des ire to see profound 
change in the political system. 
The Rise of New Political Movements 
This section briefly examines the Rete and the LN, which 
has become the main challenger to the DC and PCI in the Italian 
party system. In addition, the LN is a good illustration of a 
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party that has responded to the yearning of Italian voters for 
pol i tical moderni zat i on. Pol it ical moderni ty entai Is the 
separation of publ ic and private spheres of interest, 
bureaucratic rationality as well as an alternation of parties in 
government, something which has been noticeably absent in the 
Italian party system. 2 
Rete 
The Rete was formed in Sicily in 1990 by the former DC 
mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando. As the mayor of Palermo in 
1987, Orlando formed a coalition government with the pcr and the 
Greens instead of the PSI because he felt that the latter was 
conspiring with the Mafia. The coalition with the pcr and Greens 
allowed Orlando to launch a political struggle against the Mafia 
and clean up political life. However, his actions prompted 
resistance from DC leaders. When Andreotti and Forlani blocked 
Orlando's attempts at reforming the coalition in 1990, Orlando 
quit the DC and formed the Rete. 3 
The Rete wants to end the traditional parties' control of 
the political system since it permits the Mafia to continue to 
influence the system. 4 The party also wants to end government 
corruption and supports substantial institutional reform. 5 In 
the 1991 regional elections, the Rete received 7.3 per cent of 
the vote in Sicily and in the 1992 election it increased to 9.9 
per cent. The party did extremely well in Palermo where it 
received 24.5 per cent of the vote, second only to the DC. 
Overall, the Rete garnered 1.9 per cent of the national vote and 
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12 seats in the lower house. 6 In the local elections of June 
1993, the party obtained 3.2 per cent of the national vote, won 
7 mayoral contests and finished second in the mayoralty race in 
Turin. In the November 1993 local elections, Orlando was once 
again elected mayor of Palermo. 
Most of the Rete's support in Sicily has not come from the 
supporters of the two most corrupt and clientelistic parties 
(the DC and PSI), but from those who would have supported the 
PDS, the party which traditionally fought against corruption. 7 
More importantly, the Rete represents a challenge to the 
pervasive partitocrazia that exists in Italy. Partitocrazia 
resulted in collusion between the governing political parties 
and private groups interested in procuring state contracts and 
subsidies. In the South, many of these contracts and subsidies 
ended up in the hands of organized crime groups, such as the 
Mafia and the Camorra. a It is precisely this insidious form of 
state intervention in the South that the Rete has attacked. 
The Northern League 
The Northern League (LN) is a federation of regional 
leagues established in 1991 under the leadership of Senator 
Umberto Bossi, leader of the Lega Lombarda (Lombard League-LL). 
The LN consists of regional leagues from Veneto, Piedmont, 
Tuscany, and Lombardy of which the Lombard League (LL) is the 
largest and most important. The LN favours a federal system (the 
division of Italy into 3 regions: North, Centre and South) and 
advocates a reduction in income tax, the privatization of public 
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enterprises, an end to funding for the South, wage differentials 
between North and South, and regional control of education.9 
The LL first contested elections in the 1985 regional 
elections. In the 1987 national election, it won 0.5 per cent of 
the national vote and 2.6 per cent in the North. In the 1992 
national election, the LN won 8.7 per cent of the vote 
nationally and 20.5 per cent in the North. Throughout most of 
northern Italy, the LN became the second largest party and, in 
Milan, it became the plurality party.:l..O In fact, no other 
party has seen its share of the vote increase so significantly 
and rapidly in postwar Italy. Dismissed by some critics as a 
flash in the pan movement, the LN, in a matter of five years, 
has moved from relative electoral obscurity to seriously 
challenging the DC and PDS for local power.:I..:I.. 
The rise of the LN is the result of several factors. First, 
the departure of anti-communism, an issue at the heart of 
domestic politics in post-war Italy, facilitated the rise of the 
LN. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union and the end to the Cold War shi fted the 
focus of political discussion and electoral competition from 
anti-communism to the failures, corruption and clientelism of 
partitocrazia.:l..2 Most northern voters willingly tolerated the 
considerable graft, patronage and excessive spending of the DC 
and PSI because it was necessary for keeping the PCI out of 
national office. Once anti-communism disappeared, many 
northerners no longer could tolerate the reckless use of public 
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resources.l.:3 
Second, the European Communi ty and the creation of the 
single market also explains the sudden rise of the LN. The 
single market has introduced the language and policies of 
"competitiveness" into the Italian polity at a time when the 
underlying force of the Italian political system -anti-
communism- disintegrated. The LN has utilized Italy's entry into 
the single market as a catalyst against partitocrazia. 
Lastly, the failure of the DC-led regime to end 
parti tocrazia and to respond to the new des ires of northern 
voters (an attack on political corruption, and the desire for 
efficient public services, fiscal responsibility, relief from 
apparently high levels of taxation, an abatement of the state's 
penetration of civil society and an alternation of parties in 
power) contributed to the LN's success.l. 4 In contrast, the LN 
has denounced partitocrazia, addressed these concerns, and 
offered a solution: federalism.l.~ 
To further understand the rapid electoral rise of the LN, 
it is worthwhile to thoroughly analyze the party's electoral 
appeal. It is useful to examine who votes for the LN because it 
wi 11 provide the background for the current debate about the 
type of party the LN represents and it will shed some light on 
the party's electoral appeal. 
Who votes for the Northern League 
The LN's electoral supporters come from all social groups 
and from all points on the ideological spectrum. In terms of 
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social composition, the LN receives support from lower middle 
class workers, industrial workers, artisans, entrepreneurs, 
intellectuals, businesspersons, and well educated and less 
educated youth. 16 However, most of its support is from 
professionals and white collar workers.~7 The fact that the LN 
receives support from many social groups indicates two key 
points. 
First, the LN's composition is heterogeneous and is similar 
to that of the DC (see Chapters Two and Three). This suggests 
that the LN is obtaining the voter support of groups that 
primarily voted for the DC in the past (except for industrial 
workers).1s In addition, the LN is directly competing with the 
DC for voter support in the white zone. In fact, the LN has made 
significant inroads among voters who are peripheral members of 
the Catholic subculture. 
Second, the LN is slowly obtaining the support of northern 
industrial workers, who usually support the PCI/PDS. The 
dissolution of the PCl and the establishment of the PDS did not 
arrest the deterioration of its electoral support among blue 
collar workers. lndustr ial workers are attracted to the LN 
because workers see the LN as a party for ordinary people, while 
the PDS is perceived by some blue collar workers as an 
intellectual party. This view of the PDS is damaging its support 
among the work ing class in northern Italy. 19 In short, the 
LN I S growing appeal among northern industr ial workers poses 
problems for the PDS. The gradual erosion of support for the PDS 
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among blue collar workers in the North may imply that many 
voters perceive the PDS as being an integral part of 
partitocrazia. 20 
The LN also received electoral support from voters who 
represent different points on the ideological spectrum. 21 For 
instance, in the 1992 national election, the LN received 38 per 
cent of its support from ex-DC voters, 33 per cent from ex-PSI 
voters, 11 per cent from ex-PCI supporters, 9 per cent from 
voters who abstained in the 1987 election and 9 per cent from 
those who supported the leagues in 1987. 22 These figures 
suggest that most of the LN's support comes from the DC and PSI, 
followed by the pcr. 
The Nature of the Northern League 
While it might be too early to be really certain about the 
nature of LN's policies and appeal, some scholars have attempted 
to classify the party. In a recent article, Robert Leonardi and 
Monique Kovacs argue that the LN is a new catch~all party. They 
base their claim on the heterogeneous composition of the LN's 
electorate and on the notion that the party's appeal is not 
built on the traditional political cleavages (ideology, religion 
and class). Nonetheless, as was mentioned in Chapter TWo, to 
categorize a party on the basis of the composition of its 
electorate rather than by its actions and policies is 
reductionist and simplistic. 23 In addition, the regional 
appeal of the LN and the unlikeliness that it will become a 
national party, make it difficult to categorize the LN as a 
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catch-all party like the DC. Moreover I while the electoral 
appeal of the LN is not based on class and religion, the party's 
neo-conservative ideology attracts voter support. This may not 
be apparent at first because the LN often couches its ideology 
in terms of common sense. Hence, the classification of the LN as 
a catch-all party is simplistic, if not inaccurate. 
Other scholars have suggested that the LN represents a 
"radical right-wing populist" party.24 "Radical" in this case 
implies a repudiation of the established sociocultural and 
sociopolitical system and support for individual accomplishment, 
a fr ee mar k et economy I and less state i ntervent i on in the 
economy. "Right wing" involves a rejection of individual and 
social equality, opposition to the social assimilation of 
marginalized groups and coded xenophobic statements. "Populist" 
includes an exploitation of the public's feelings of uneasiness 
and disappointment, and appeals to ordinary people and their 
common sense.::!!!> 
The LN appears to meet the criteria of a radical right-wing 
populist party. The LN is considered radical because it rejects 
Italy's centralized unitary state and wants to replace it with 
a federal system because it feels that Italy was never 
ethnically, historically or culturally homogeneous. 26 Thus, 
the LN is challenging the political system that has been in 
place since 1870. 
Second, the LN is aright-wing party because it opposes 
immigration from Third World countries. It is also a right-wing 
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party because it makes thinly veiled racist statements. For 
instance, in July 1993 Bossi called Muslims "barbarians". He 
claimed that the comment referred to the party's foreign policy 
towards Islamic countries, but the comment appealed to racist 
sentiments in Italy.27 
The LN is also a populist party because it has capitalized 
on the public's uncertainty about Italy's competitive position-
given its huge public debt and the perception of an inefficient 
public sector-in the European Community's single market. The 
party also is popular among many ordinary Italians because Bossi 
uses vir i Ie language that they can understand and avoids the 
convoluted political jargon that most Italian politicians employ 
to character i ze soc ia 1 and pol i tical events. '.a e For example, 
during the June 1993 mayoral election campaign in Milan, Bossi 
called left-wing candidate Nando Dalla Chiesa a cornuto (a 
cuckold).29 In short, the LN appears to be more of a radical 
right-wing popul ist party than a catch-all party despi te the 
fact that most of its voters are from the centre of the 
political spectrum. 30 The next section explains the LN's 
electoral appeal. 
The Electoral Appeal of the Northern League 
The electoral appeal of the LN is primarily based on four 
factors, which include: the LN's anti-meridionalismo (anti-
southern stance), anti-immigrant stance, regional identity and 
anti-parti tocrazia.:n Among these reasons, some have argued 
that the LN's anti-partitocrazia stance is the most important 
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factor in explaining the electoral surge of the LN. 32 For 
example, a study found that over 80 per cent supported the LN 
solely because of its anti-partitocrazia stance. 33 More 
importantly, although it is a new political party, the multi-
faceted appeal of the LN explains its growing electoral support. 
The LN has avoided the fate of other anti-partitocrazia parties, 
such as the PRad and the Greens. Both parties concentrated on 
single issues-civil liberties in the case of the PRad; the 
environment in the case of the Greens-which severely limited 
their electoral growth. 34 
The Lega Nord's anti-Meridionalismo 
Bossi and others first based anti-meridionalismo on the 
belief that southerners were culturally different, rejected 
modern values and were dependent on the state. However, many 
said that this was "racist", which prompted the LN to change its 
views on southerners. The LN now argues that it is against the 
clientelistic politics of the South perpetrated by 
partitocrazia, but not against southerners per se. 35 In other 
words, the LN argues that its anti-meridionalismo is more a 
function of its opposition to partitocrazia than racism. 36 
However, the LN's evolution on the issue of racism is doubtful 
because Bossi continues to make covert racist statements. 
The LN's anti-southern posture is based on four key 
factors. First, some northerners harbour anti-southern emotions 
because many southerners have come to the North and compete with 
northerners for jobs in the public sector. Moreover, northerners 
131 
harbour ant i -southern sentiments because the publ ic sector, 
whose employees are disproportionately from the South, provides 
poor services. Many northerners believe that the government is 
more concerned with providing employment to southerners than 
providing quality and efficient public services to northerners 
because it generates electoral support for the governing parties 
in the South. 
This has led to the wide-spread perception that the North 
is being controlled by politicians and bureaucrats in Rome, who 
are primarily from the South. This perception does contain some 
element of truth as 60 per cent of the public administration is 
composed of southerners who make up roughly a third of the 
Italian population.~7 However, southerners only occupy 38 per 
cent of the top positions in the major political parties. 3s 
Although figures do not fully SUbstantiate the "southernization" 
of public life, the fact that most of the support received by 
the governing parties (DC and PSI) now comes from the South 
reinforces this view. During the 1980s, the DC and PSI 
increasingly fought over spoils, undermining their credibility 
in government. Hence, the government's emphasis upon the 
alleviation of southern unemployment over the efficient delivery 
of public services is largely responsible for producing anti-
southern feelings. 39 
A second factor that contributed to the LN's anti-
southernism is the transfer of northern private sector jobs to 
the South in order to take advantage of public subsidies offered 
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by government. Despite the fact that large sums of public funds 
have been allocated to the South, it remains economically 
underdeveloped when compared with northern Italy. For instance, 
by the 1970s the South's share of the national GDP remained 
unchanged from what it was 20 years before. Incomes in the South 
between 1945 and 1980 were 50 per cent below the national 
average, while in the 1980s, they were 40 per cent below the 
national average. 40 Since state intervention has not worked in 
the South, many northerners feel that the capital allocated to 
the South is a waste of taxpayers' money. Thus, many northerners 
believe that public funds are profligately spent in the South in 
order for the governing parties to consolidate their electoral 
support there. 
A third element in the LN's anti-southernism is its anti-
Mafia posture. According to the LN, an end to the partitocrazia 
would faci 1 i tate the state's fight against the Ma£ ia. Many 
northerners think that the governing parties do not want to 
eradicate the Mafia because it could jeopardize a sizeable 
portion of its electoral base in the South. The collusion 
between the Mafia and the government has created anti-southern 
feelings amongst some northerners. 
Finally, cultural differences between a "European" North 
and a "Mediterranean" South have contributed to the LN's anti-
meridionalismo. 41 Many northerners hold anti-southern 
sentiments because those southerners who live in the North have 
not integrated into the North's "European" culture, which 
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stresses individual rights and impersonal rule. Instead, these 
southerners maintain their "Mediterranean" life-style, which is 
based on particularism and clientelism. 42 
Anti-Immigrant Sentiments 
The electoral appeal of the LN also stems from the party's 
anti-immigrant posture. Anti-immigrant feelings began to emerge 
in the latter half of the 1980s as immigrants began to arrive in 
the major urban centres of the North.43 This allowed the 
national government to pass social costs such as housing, health 
care, food, clothing and policing on to local northern 
communities. These developments generated anti-immigrant 
sentiments amongst northerners. 
While the national government's immigration policy may have 
engendered anti-immigrant feelings among northerners, the LN has 
also manipulated anti-immigrant sentiments among northerners, 
many 0 f whom fee 1 that immigrants, espec i ally v is ible 
minorities, are a threat to Italian culture. The LN wants 
immigration from the Third World halted because it believes that 
it poses a cultural threat to Italy. Milan city council, now 
headed by the LN, is cons ider ing the expuls ion of immigrants 
from Milan.44 
The Lega Nord's Regional Identity 
The establ ishment of a new collective identity based on 
regionalism, partly explains the electoral appeal of the LN, 
and, in particular, the Lega Lombarda. This regional identity 
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pr imar i ly centres on the Lombard community, which is 
characterized by hard work and honesty.45 However, when the LN 
was established, regional identity was extended to include the 
"people of the Po Valley."46 
While few people support the LN's integral federalism, 
disaffected voters who are looking for an alternative to the DC 
and PCI/PDS are attracted to the LN because of the new 
collective identity it offers voters.47 The growing prominence 
of regionalism as an ideology in Italy is largely a result of 
the crisis of Communism and Catholicism, two ideologies which 
dominated the political landscape until the 19808. 48 The 
decline of the Catholic and Communist subcultures in Italy 
created an ideological void 
which the Lega Lombarda 
regionalism. 49 
in the Italian political system, 
filled with the ideology of 
In many of the small towns and medium sized cities of the 
white zone, the LN's regional identity is supplanting the 
region's Catholic identity.50 This shows the continued 
importance of subcultures in the Italian political system. Like 
the Cathol ic and Communist subcultures, the LN subculture is 
obtaining support from many collateral organizations which, in 
the past, integrated individuals into the two dominant 
subcultures. 5 l. The LN provides a sense of communal belonging 
to voters, especially those that were previously inactive and 
alienated from traditional meeting places such as the Church or 
factory.52 
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The Lega Nord's anti-partitocrazia appeal 
The LN has enjoyed electoral success in the North because 
of its harsh attack on corruption and inefficiency in the 
national government and its opposition to partitocrazia. In the 
eyes of many voters, partitocrazia is synonymous with the 
traditional political parties that have existed in Italy since 
the late 1940s. The governing political parties used the state 
apparatus to provide material benefits to loyal party supporters 
at the expense of the general public. The tangentopoli scandal, 
involving thousands of politicians and businesses charged with 
receiving and paying bribes for the awarding of public contracts 
at the national and local level, is a current reminder of the 
corruption and decay of partitocrazia. 
Partitocrazia has been used by the DC and PSI to counteract 
a decline in their share of subcultural and opinion voters in 
the 1980s.~3 The use of clientelism benefited both parties in 
the South, where they increased their share of the vote. Many 
northern Italians are opposed to partitocrazia because it has 
obscured the division between the public and private domains, 
especially in the South where almost all economic activity is 
dependent on state intervention. The LN wants to prevent 
partitocrazia from swallowing private initiative and the 
entrepreneurial culture that exists in the North.~4 
For decades the major political parties positioned 
centrally nominated functionaries in the regional, provincial 
and local governments of the North. These party functionaries 
were not concerned with local issues, 
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but instead were 
interested in maintaining electoral support for their respective 
political parties throw3h the use of patronage. In the end, 
local interests were subordinated to the interests of the major 
national (?arties, which eventually resulted in an electoral 
revolt of northern Italians against corrupt and unresponsive 
parties in government. 55 
In short, the LN's anti-partitocrazia stance is one of its 
primary sources of support because many voters, especially 
northerners, are tired of a system of government that has bred 
patronage, corruption, incompetency, political immobilism, and 
distrust in government.!5G For instance, a 1980 survey found 
that 85 per cent of Italians believed that the political class 
is dishonest, while 70 per cent believed it was incompetent. 
This level of distrust continued through the 1980s and into the 
19905, but did not manifest itself in anti-government protest 
until the early 19905. 
The Emergence of the North-South and Centre-Periphery Cleavages 
The electoral ascent of the LN and the Rete indicates the 
growing importance of two cleavages in the Italian party system: 
the North-South and the centre-periphery cleavages. In the past, 
the Italian party system was dominated by religious, class and 
ideo log ica1 cleavages. The secular i zat ion 0 f I tal i an soc i ety 
reduced the saliency of the religious cleavage, while 
postmaterialism and post-industrialization diminished the 
importance of class politics. Moreover, the PCI/PDS's move to 
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the centre since the 1970s and a general decline in ideological 
polarization in Western society diminished the significance of 
the traditional left-right ideological division.~7 
The electoral climb of the LN indicates that a cleavage 
based on a North-South dichotomy has emerged. The North-South 
split has always existed in Italy but it has remained latent in 
the I tal ian party sys tem since 1946. However, by 1990, the 
North-South split became more meaningful when the regional 
leagues used the North-South dichotomy to galvanize voters.~a 
The North-South dichotomy resurfaced in 1990 because the 
disappearance of anti-communism gave northerners an opportunity 
to finally complain about the state's subsidi zation of the 
South, which was a major feature of the post-war national party 
system. The large sums of state capital directed to the South 
did not substantially diminish the socioeconomic gap between the 
North and South. The end result was that the divergence between 
the North and South became entrenched in public policy 
making.~9 
According to LN supporters and cultural dual ists (those 
that believe that Italy has a dual political culture), the 
differences between North and South are not only economic, but 
also social. First, there is the pervasiveness of organized 
crime groups such as the Mafia (Sicily), 'Ndrangheta (Calabria) 
and Camorra (Campania) in the South.sO Second, they have 
suggested that the South is characterized by the lack of an 
entrepreneur ial spir it. Any entrepreneur ial spir it that was 
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present has been suffocated by organized crime groups using 
extortion. 51 Lastly, cultural dualists suggest that the South 
is characterized by personalism. Southerners have strong ties to 
individuals, which explains the pervasiveness of clientelism, 
and the greater use of the voto di preferenza (preference vote) 
in the South than in the North. Personalism also explains the 
tendency among southerners to apply particularistic criteria to 
most situations (as opposed to universal criteria).62 
Furthermore, the em~rgence of new anti-partltocrazia forces 
signals the gr owi ng impor tance in the d i v is i on between the 
centre and periphery. The centre (state) is growing more distant 
from the periphery (civil society) because of its antiquated 
method of governing (partltocrazia). In effect, the new cleavage 
dimension that is emerging in the Italian party system is one 
between tradition, represented by the centre, and modernity, 
embodied by the northern/central periphery. The reason the 
state-civil society division is associated with the North-South 
split is because by the 1980s the North was a well developed 
economic periphery.53 In effect, both new cleavages reinforce 
one another. 
Many northerners now view the centralized state as the 
source of local problems and do not believe the traditional 
parties can deal with the major problems plaguing Italy.54 The 
governing parties' monopolistic use of state resources to garner 
electoral backing may have consolidated support in the South, 
but it al i enated many northern voters. 515 In th is env ironment 
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of alienation, the LN and the Rete are offer ing voters an 
al ternati ve to the governing parties by advocating an end to 
partitocrazia. 
The rise of new political movements could be attributed to 
the failure of the governing political class to effect 
substantial political modernization. The state, which has been 
dominated by the DC political machine for the past 45 years, 
does not represent modern principles, but instead embodies the 
features of a clientelistic state,55 The LN has attempted to 
defend the liberties of the individual and the local community 
from an intruding state (centre) that represents stagnation, 
decay and corruption. 57 
The attacks of the LN against the centre are partially 
founded upon the attempts to decentralize power in Italian 
politics since the 1970s. 6s In addition, the fundamental 
socioeconomic and cultural changes that occurred in Italian 
society since the 1950s made the region rather than the nation 
the locus of economic advancement, partisan association and 
governmental legi timization. 69 Rapid economic growth in most 
regions of northern Italy in the 1960s and 1970s drew these 
regions closer to Northern Europe, while Rome and the South 
appeared to grow more distant. By the 1980s, a burgeoning 
northern Italy was still part of a Mediterranean, archaic and 
bloated Italian state, that faltered in its attempt to extricate 
itself from the iron jaws of partitocrazia. 70 
In short, a division that is becoming more salient in 
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Italian society centres on a division between a modern civil 
society (periphery) located primarily in the North and North-
Centre, and a state (centre) controlled by an overly pervasive 
governing class. The centre-periphery cleavage is becoming more 
important in galvanizing voters than cleavages based on 
religion, class and ideology.7~ New political forces, 
especially the LN, have been able to capitalize on the yearning 
of most Italians for a restoration of the political system. 72 
The emergence of the North-South and centre-periphery cleavages 
indicates that the Italian party system is in the midst of a 
transition, TNhich has been accelerated by the fall of communism. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined changes in the very nature of the 
Italian party system. There was extensive fragmentation of the 
party system and there was an increase in support for new 
political movements. A brief discussion about the nature of the 
LN revealed that it was more a radical right-wing populist party 
than a catch-all party. Moreover, the chapter found that the 
LN's electoral appeal was based on four factors: anti-
meridlonallsmo, anti-immigration, regional identity and anti-
partltocrazia. Lastly, the appearance of new political forces 
indicated that the North-South and the centre-periphery 
cleavages are becoming more important in the Italian political 
system. 
These 
challenges 
developments have created a number of serious 
for the PDS and the DC. The next chapter br i ef ly 
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describes and analyzes the salient political events since the 
April 1992 national election and assesses their impact on the DC 
and P D S . As are suI t , apr 0 g nos i sis 0 f fer e don the f u t u r e 
development of the Italian party system. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion, Current Developments in the Italian 
Party System and the Political Future of the DC and PDS 
This paper has attempted to explain the decline in 
electoral support for the Italian Christian Democratic Party 
(DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCr)/ the Democratic 
Party of the Left (PDS), with the objective of providing a 
better understanding of the degree and direction of change in 
the Italian party system. This chapter includes a restatement 
oft h e the sis I a summa r y 0 f the stu d Y ! S fin din gsa n d a 
discussion of their implications for the Italian party system 
in general. In addition, a synopsis of key political 
developments since the April 1992 national election is 
presented, and their implications for both parties are 
discussed. Finally, a forecast about the future of the Italian 
party system with particular reference to the DC and PDS is 
offered. 
Summary 
The main argument advanced in this paper is the 
following: the decrease in the electoral support for the DC 
and PCI/PDS is primarily the result of political factors and 
only secondarily the result of societal changes. Political 
factors include each party's strategy and the resolution of 
the communist question (the collapse of communism in Eastern 
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Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the end to the Cold 
War). Societal changes encompassed socioeconomic and 
demograph i c (s tructural) changes and the weak en i ng a f the 
Catholic and Communist subcultures. 
Chapter Three 
socioeconomic and 
electoral support 
first examined the 
demographic changes 
for the DC and pcr. 
relationship between 
and the decline in 
The ma j or economic 
change in Italy was the transition from an agrarian economy to 
a post-industrial economy within a thirty year period. 
Demographic changes included the entry of young voters into 
the electorate in the mld-1970s and the decline in support for 
the DC among women. 
The structural approach to the study of the electoral 
dec 1 I ne of the DC and pcr had severa I weaknesses. First I 
socioeconomic changes did not directly lead to electoral 
changes because both the DC and PCI were supported by a broad 
collection of social classes. Second, the influence of 
demographi c var iables, such as youth and gender, on the 
electoral support of both parties was more a function of 
secularization and modernization, twin processes undermining 
the Catholic and Communist subcultures. 
The study revealed that structural changes, in and of 
themselves, did not directly cause the decline of the DC and 
PCI. In other words, these changes did not necessarily result 
in a decline in support for either party. In an attempt to 
maintain the support of occupational and social groups 
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af fected by s tructura 1 changes, both part i es respond ed by 
devising political strategies. The structural approach is also 
flawed since it assumes that party systems are str ictly 
structured by social cleavages that are generated by the 
socioeconomic system. In addition, this model cannot account 
for sudden shifts and changes in voter support. This method of 
analyzing electoral change ignores the fact that political 
factors and political parties can also produce change in the 
party system. In short, the structural approach provided a 
weak and incomplete explanation of the electoral decline of 
the DC and PCI. 
Chapter Three also investigated the relationship between 
the decline of the Catholic and Communist subcultures and the 
decl ine in electoral support for the DC and PCI. The most 
obvious indicator of the decline of the Catholic subculture is 
the decline in Church attendance. With a decreasing pool of 
practising Catholics, the Church and its lay associations 
exerted less influence over Italian voters. Many Catholic 
organizations also distanced themselves from the DC and did 
not adamantly support the party as they had in the past. 
Indicators that demonstrated a decline in the Communist 
subculture included a less sympathetic attitude towards the 
carL and the former-U.S.S.R and a decrease in unionization 
rates. 
A study of the waning of Italy's two dominant subcultures 
showed that the share of the electorate that belonged to 
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either subculture gradually decreased and that the degree of 
attachment slowly declined as well. Equally important, this 
study found that belonging to a subculture was a matter of 
degree rather than a matter of belonging or not belonging. 
Core members of a subculture were more likely to vote for the 
party that was associated with the subculture than those on 
the periphery of the subculture, which indirectly explained 
some of the decline in voter support for the DC and PCI. 
Like the structural changes, the subcultural thesis had 
some faults. First, the weakening of the subcultures eroded 
party attachments and created more opinion voters, but this 
did not necessarily result in a decline in electoral support 
for the DC and PC!. Although a sizeable share of the 
electorate was no longer strongly attached to either 
subculture, this did not preclude the DC and pcr from devising 
strategies that would capture these voters. In brief, both 
explanations in Chapter Three assumed that environmental 
changes directly led to an electoral decline in support for 
the DC and PCI. However, these interpretations were too 
deterministic and ignored the primary importance of political 
factors. Moreover, they do not explain the fact that the DC 
vote remained resilient until 1992. 
Chapter Four examined political factors in the electoral 
decline of the DC and pcr. First, the crisis and collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union eroded 
the electoral support for the DC and PCr/PDS. Although the pcr 
distanced itself from Soviet communism, 
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many Italians 
perceived that the PCI was still linked to communism 
internationally during the mid-to-Iate 1980s. Consequently, a 
significant portion of the population were extremely wary of 
the PCI and when communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in the 
late 1980s, many Italians, especially young people, associated 
the pcr with the discredited and failed communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe. This image of the pcr was exacerbated by the 
qoverning parties, especially the DC and PSI f that the pcr 
could not be trusted. In brief, the PCI was discredited as an 
alternative to the DC regime among many reformist voters 
because the PCI adhered to a philosophy that was bankrupt. 
Second, the resolution of the communist question also 
contributed to the decline of the DC because it was the main 
benefactor of the anti-communist vote, providing its raison 
d'etre and permitting it to remain in power for the last 45 
years.~ The DC was the main benefactor of the anti-communist 
vote because the PCI could not come to power in a country 
closely allied to the U.S. Since the PCI could not form a 
government, an opposition that could replace the ruling DC 
coalition was unlikely until the communist issue disappeared. 
The fact that the PCI/PDS was excluded from government between 
1947 and 1993 demonstrates that the evolution of the Italian 
party system and Italian politics in general, closely followed 
developments in the Cold War.2 The discussion revealed that 
the Cold War gap, at both the domestic and international 
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levels, was one of the most important factors shaping postwar 
politics in Italy. 
With the probable exception of Japan, the fact that the 
DC was adversely affected by the collapse of communism is 
peculiar to the Italian party system. In the party systems of 
most other western democracies, the collapse of communism has 
primarily weakened the left. However, in Italy, the collapse 
of communism has not only negatively affected the PCI, but has 
contr ibuted to the collapse of the DC reg ime. (DC and small 
centrist parties with which it governed.) Although this is a 
deviation from the conventional argument, the way in which the 
collapse of communism affected the Italian party system is 
understandable given the fact that the DC regime remained in 
power primarily because of its anti-communist stance. 
Chapter Four also examined the political strategies of 
both part ies to demonstrate that, in a per iod with more 
political competition amongst parties and voter volatility, 
the DC and PCI followed strategies that failed to garner the 
support of opinion voters. The DC responded to the changing 
socioeconomic circumstances by attempting to shed its 
increasingly corrupt and negative public image. However, the 
party failed largely because of the leadership's inability to 
curb the power of factions. 3 More specifically, De Mita's 
attempts to renew the DC and trans form it into a moderate 
conservative party failed because the DC could not resolve the 
dilemma between southern exchange voters, who favoured the old 
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DC of patronage, and northern opinion voters, who wanted an 
end to patronage and favoured good, efficient and honest 
government. 
Since the DC was unable to steer a clear reformist 
course, its leadership continued to rely on a negative 
progr:amme, which included anti-communism, Catholicism and 
clientelism to garner electoral support. This technique was 
suitable before 1990, but by this time, secularization had 
weakened Catholicism, the collapse of communism rendered the 
anti-communist vote irrelevant and the economic r:ecession 
dried up the public resources available for patronage. Despite 
repeated calls for reform from within the party, the DC 
leadership did not realize that it had to give voters positive 
reasons to support the party. Instead the DC continued to 
define itself by what it opposed rather than by what it 
supported, which proved disastrous in the April 1992 election 
when the DC's support fell below the 30 per cent mark for the 
first time in its history. 
The PCI/PDS reacted to the changing socioeconomic and 
cultural environment by adopting strategies that would 
legitimize the party as a credible alternative to the DC 
regime. These strategies failed to achieve their objective 
because the party did not resolve a fundamental division 
between its left and right wings. The pel's strategies since 
the 1970s have undermined the party's credibility as a 
reformist alternative among left-wing and moderate centre-left 
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voters. 
For most of the 1970s, the PCI followed the "Historic 
Compromise" strategy, which tried to effect significant 
changes in Italy and legitimize the PCI as a governing party 
by cooperating with the DC. However, the PCI was not able to 
achieve significant reform or able to legitimize itself as a 
governing party. Instead, its cooperation with the DC tainted 
its reformist image. 
The lUstor ic Compromise created the impression in the 
minds of many leftist voters that the PCI no longer 
represented a political force that could effect substantial 
change. Consequently, the PCI lost votes in the 1979 election 
primarily to parties on its left. Moreover, since the PCI 
never obtained cabinet posts it did not legitimize itself as 
a governing party among centre-left voters. 
For most of the 1980s, the pcr followed the "democratic 
al ternat i ve", which advocated an all iance wi th the I tal i an 
Socialist Party (PSI) and other progressive forces. This 
strategy was ambiguous since it attempted to reconcile the 
left and right wings of the party and because the PSI was 
hostile towards the PCI. This strategy included overtures to 
radical social movements, making many centre-left voters 
reluctant to support the PCI. By the late 1980s, the strategy 
had failed and party secretary Achille Occhetto responded by 
launching a series of SUbstantial reforms that culminated with 
the dissolution of the PCI and the formation of the PDS. 
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However, this development failed to resolve the division 
between the left and right wings and resulted in an ambiguous 
political line, which made many voters wary of the PDS. 
Chapter Five discussed changes in the Italian party 
system, such as party fragmentation and the rise of new 
political movements challenging the DC and PCI for national 
power such as the Rete and the Lega Nord (LN). The rise of the 
LN also indicated the growing importance of the North-South 
split and the division between the centre and periphery. This 
is relevant because it shows that the Italian party system, 
which was primarily based on religious and ideological 
cleavages in the past, is being structured by other cleavages. 
New Developments 
The key political developments since the April 1992 
election include the ongoing tangentopoli investigations, 
local and administrative elections in June 1993, the April 18, 
1993 referendum and the approval of the new electoral law on 
August 4, 1993. 
The ongoing tangentopoli investigations, which began in 
February 1992, have implicated roughly 150 members of 
Parliament who are under investigation for offenses varying 
from corruption, bribery, illegal party financing, extortion, 
collusion with organized crime and even murder. 4 Those being 
investigated include three former pr ime ministers (Bettino 
Craxi, Ciriaco De Mita and Giulio Andreotti), former cabinet 
ministers and well known businessmen. The most common charge 
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is taking bribes in exchange for awarding contracts. 
Table 6.1 
June 1993 Local Election Results 
(as a percentage of the total vote from party lists) 
LN 28.3 MSI 6.3 
DC 19.3 PLI 5.5 
PDS 16.2 Greens 3.3 
PSI 9.1 L. Pannella 3.2 
RC 7.9 Rete 3.2 
PRI 7.9 PSDI 2.9 
Source: Corriere della Sera, June 8, 1993, p. 10. 
The June 1993 local elections, which took place in 
selective areas and involved 11 million voters!S, were the 
first significant elections in light of the recent bribery 
scandal. The results indicated several key points. First, the 
traditional governing parties did poorly and only received a 
combined total of 36.8 per cent of the vote, with the DC and 
PSI incurring the largest losses. s In particular, the DC fell 
to 19.3 per cent of the vote, down 10.3 since the last local 
elections.? (See Table 6.1.) The continued decline of the 
governing parties suggests that the tradi tional centre is 
disappearing. s 
Second, most observers suggested that the principal 
victors in this election were the LN and the PDS. The LN 
received 28.3 per cent of the vote, up 16.3 per cent from the 
last local elections. Nonetheless, the LN vote in June is a 
bit skewed because most of the key elections were held in the 
North. 
Third, the LN became the plurality party in the North and 
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the PDS was the plurality party in the centre (the traditional 
"red zone") and the DC, despite its decline, continued to be 
the plurality party of the South.s Table 6.2 suggests that 
Italian voters are growing more divided along regional lines. 
Table 6.2 
A Regional Breakdown of the June 6, 1993 Local Elections 
(as a percentage of valid votes cast) 
LN 
PDS 
DC 
North 
32.0 
10.7 
10.4 
Centre 
1.6 
22.0 
20.1 
Source: Panorama, June 20, 1993, p. 39. 
south 
9.1 
28.3 
Another important event was the referendum held on April 
18, 1993 in which roughly 83 per cent voted to abolish the 
proportional representation (PR) electoral system used to 
elect the Senate. This vote clearly demonstrated that Italians 
wanted to abolish PR and replace it with a first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) electoral system. 10 Many Italians saw electoral 
reform as a way of providing more honest, efficient, and 
responsible government. This referendum provided the impetus 
for electoral reform, which the political parties have been 
squabbling over for the last decade. 
The last important event was the approval of a new 
electoral law on August 4, 1993. Two ballots will be used to 
elect the Chamber of Deputies in the future. The first ballot 
allows voters to elect 75 per cent of the deputies utilizing 
a single member plurality system. The second ballot will be 
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used to elect the remaining 25 per cent using a PR system. 
Only parties wi th at least 4 per cent of the vote can be 
awarded seats by PR.11 
In contrast, only one ballot will be used to elect the 
Senate. Similar to the lower house, 75 per cent of the Senate 
seats will be elected employing the single member plurality 
system. The other 25 per cent will be elected using PRo Unlike 
the election to the lower house, no threshold is required 
before seats are allocated by PR.12 
The Implications of the New Developments for the DC and PDS 
Although the bribery scandal has involved all the 
traditional political parties (with the exception of the MSI), 
the DC and the PSI have been most adversely affected by it. 
The public, especially in the North, is growing exceedingly 
hostile towards the traditional governing parties and is tired 
of their corrupt practices. The decline in support for the DC 
in the June 1993 elections demonstrates that it is in a deep 
political crisis. The election results caused Ermanno 
Gorrieri, a Catholic sociologist, to state that the DC has 
ceased to be a key protagonist in Italian politics. 13 While 
this comment sounds a bit hasty, the DC needs to take action 
in order to reverse the trend or, at least, stop the decline. 
The PDS, although not as heavily involved in the 
tangentopoli scandal, has been hurt by the arrest of the 
PCl's treasurer in Turin, Primo Greganti, who has been charged 
with illegal party financing. These charges have diminished 
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the credibility of the PDS as an anti-corruption party. Hence, 
most voters now believe that the PDS is no different than all 
the other traditional parties. 
On the other hand, the PDS appeared to arrest its 
electoral decline and did particularly well in the red zone. 
The PDS was successful in these elections because of its 
alliances with other parties of the left.14 However, on its 
own, the party did very poorly in areas outside the red zone. 
For example, in the cities of Turin and Milan, the PDS came 
fourth behind its left-wing rival, the Communist 
Refoundation.J.s 
The new electoral law may compel small political parties 
to dis sol ve and j 0 i n 1 a r g e r po 1 i tic a 1 for rna t ion s 0 r a 11 y 
themselves with larger parties in pre-electoral pacts. 
Likewise, the DC and PDS may have to form electoral alliances 
if they hope to win where they are not the plurality party or 
they might target specific ridings where they have a good 
chance of winning.J.G 
Between the DC and PDS, the DC has been most affected by 
recent developments. In response, DC party secretary Mino 
Martinazzoli launched another effort to reform the party. 
Martinazzoli characterized the reform of the DC as "rinnovare 
senza rinnegare" (to renew without renouncing the DC's 
heritage) and warned that if the DC did not reform itself, it 
would become a spent pol it ical force. J. 7 In July 1993, the 
DC's constituent assembly ratified a motion to change the name 
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of the party. The constituent assembly recommended that the DC 
change its name to the Partito Popolare (Popular Party). 
Besides a cosmetic name change, the DC is adopting rigid 
moral rules to clean up its tainted image. For instance, those 
who are being investigated, standing trial and convicted of 
offenses while in public office will not be allowed to renew 
or obtain membership. Although the DC plans to reform itself, 
it is uncertain how the public will react. Some voters may see 
its latest attempt to reform itself as a cynical ploy to hold 
onto power. One thing is certain: the DC will need to convince 
voters that its renewal is genuine. 
The latest developments and their impact on the DC and 
PDS are not surprising given the discussion in previous 
chapters. The recent crackdown on political corruption and the 
fervent opposition to the partitocrazia have largely occurred 
because of the decline of communism and the end to the Cold 
War. In this post-Cold War environment, both the DC and PDS 
have failed to offer voters clear alternatives to the 
political programme of the LN. 
The Future of the Italian Party System 
With Italy's new electoral law in place, many foreign 
journal is ts expect that party fragmentat i on wi 11 disappear. In 
addition, they believe that the new electoral law will 
eliminate the unstable coalition governments which have vexed 
Italy since 1945. However, these predictions underestimate the 
degree of division that still exists in Italy today and make 
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various assumptions, 
Party fragmentation may be el iminated or, at least, 
contained, if political aggregation occurs amongst Italy's 
curr ent po 1 it ical part i es, I f no aggr egat i on occurs, Italy 
might be faced with a situation in which no single party 
obtains more than 30 per cent of the vote, preventing any 
party from winning a majority of the seats,LS Hence, without 
political aggregation, party fragmentation will continue and 
stable majority governments cannot be formed, thereby 
undermining one of the reasons a new electoral law was 
introduced (to provide stable, purposive governments) ,19 
The problem of party fragmentation is compounded by 
growing regional divisions. Accordingly, some observers are 
discussing the scenario of the "3 Italys",20 Many observers 
foresee a North dominated by the LN, a Centre (the red zone) 
loyal to the left, especially the PDS, and a South dominated 
by the DC and other traditional political parties. 21 Hence, 
national political parties with representation in all parts of 
the country could disappear. Under a primarily majoritarian 
electoral system, regional divisions could be magnified and a 
regionally fragmented parliament could emerge, especially if 
political aggregation does not occur. In short, due to 
continued political fragmentation and regional divisions, 
seven or eight parties may be represented in Parliament. 
Another school of thought foresees an I tal ian party 
system with an alternation in power between a centre-left or 
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progressive pole and a centre-right or conservative pole. 22 
The party system has been divided into three poles (left, 
centre and right) with the DC dominated centre governing Italy 
for roughly 45 years. However, wi th the disappearance of 
Communism and the decline of Catholicism, a bi-polar system is 
more probable. 23 
Nonetheless, the problem with this prediction is that 
there are many divisions within both poles. The centre-left is 
divided between materialists (Communist Refoundation (RC), 
parts of the PSI and PDS) and postmaterialists (Greens, 
Radical Party). It is also divided on economic issues with the 
Republican Party and the PSI more laissez-faire oriented than 
the other parties. In addition, the long standing rivalry and 
animosity between the PSI and PCI/PDS and a newly developed 
one between the RC and PDS may hinder the format i on of a 
united progressive pole. Finally, a united progressive pole is 
unlikely since the divisions and ambiguity within the PDS have 
not disappeared. 
The centre-right is also divided. The DC and the LN are 
d i v ided on the ques t i on of centra 1 i zation wi th the former 
favouring a strong central government and the latter favouring 
a federal system with a weak central government. In addition, 
the LN is more laissez-faire than the DC, which has invariably 
used the state to intervene in the economy. Moreover, given 
the LN's criticism of the DC and the regime, it is difficult 
to see how both parties could form a centre-right alliance. 
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A bipolar system would have been more likely if Italy 
adopted a majoritarian electoral system with a second round of 
voting. This system encourages political aggregation and 
facilitates the formation of stable coalition governments. 24 
The Future of the DC and the PDS 
The April 1993 referendum on electoral reform and the 
results of the June 1993 local elections indicate that Italy 
is headed for change. The post-Cold War Italy is marked by 
increased electoral competition and greater electoral 
volatility at the polls. Hence, it is difficult to speculate 
how the DC and PDS will fare in the next national election 
which is likely to occur in the spring of 1994. 
An examination of two key pillars of DC support 
(clientelism, Catholicism) may give an indication of where the 
DC is headed. Clientelism will probably provide the DC with 
votes in the next election, especially in the South. However, 
the use of clientelism is problematic for several reasons. 
First, the use of clientelism runs the risk of losing more 
among northern voters. Second, the resources available for 
clientelism are in short supply because of the recession and 
Italy's huge public debt. Third, clientelistic voters in the 
South might abandon the DC and its traditional allies and 
support the party or parties that appear likely to form the 
next government. 25 
Catholicism is also a dwindling source of support for the 
DC. Many observers interpreted the June 1993 local election 
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results as the end to the political unity of Catholics (i.e., 
practising Catholics vote for the DC).26 Due to the DC's 
corrupt image, many practising Catholics have abandoned the DC 
and supported the LN and Rete. However, the DC could recapture 
some of these voters if it genuinely reforms itself. Moreover, 
since secularization has bottomed out, the pool of practising 
Catholics has not fallen, which is good news for a party whose 
main source of support comes from practising Catholics. 
Recent polls and election results indicate that the DC is 
receiving nearly 20 per cent of the vote, which has placed the 
DC's status as Italy's plurality party in peril.27 A recent 
poll found that only 52.7 per cent of DC voters remained loyal 
to the party between the April 1992 election and the June 1993 
elections. 29 This figure is not encouraging for a party 
trying to arrest its electoral decline. The growing 
"southernization" of the DC's support threatens to split the 
party into North and South wings, which would be pol it ical 
suicide for the DC and dangerous for the country.29 
More importantly, it is too hasty to relegate the DC to 
the dustbin of political history. The party still has strong 
support in the South and adequate support (around 20 per cent) 
in the Centre and North-East. Although only half its voters 
remained loyal, the DC only lost a third of its 1992 support 
in the June 1993 elections, which suggests that the DC may 
have obta ined votes fr om the other govern i ng part i es (PLI I 
PSDI, PRI, PSI). Hence, based on present conditions, it is 
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likely to be Italy's third largest party. Nonetheless, the 
tangentopoli scandal continues to hurt the DC I S electoral 
support as the results of the November 1993 local elections 
indicated. To retain its plurality status, the DC will have to 
regain some of the voters that now support the LN. A recent 
poll suggested that the Italian electorate is becoming more 
volatile, which provides the DC (or PPI) with an occasion to 
recapture voters by projecting an image of reform and offering 
voters a constructive programme •. 30 Although no longer 
dominant, a newly reconstituted DC will still have a role to 
play in the Italian party system and could possibly be part of 
a coalition with the PDS. 
The June 1993 elections confirmed that the PDS is still 
the largest party on the left. However, the PDS is competing 
against the RC for industrial workers in the North and against 
Rete for liberal Catholic voters. Occhetto is trying to keep 
all the parties on the left within a progressive pole and 
hopes to form a pre-electoral coalition with some of them. 31 
This would at least increase the PDS' chances of leading the 
next government. However, this progressive coalition contains 
many disparate elements and it may be difficult to devise 
coherent policies that all parties support. Such an alliance 
may contain extremist elements like the RC, which could scare 
voters from supporting the coalition.~2 
In short, the PDS is still a dominant political force in 
Italian politics.:D Even if the PDS does not ally itself 
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with other parties, the latest poll results predict that the 
PDS may emerge as Italy's largest party.~4 Consequently, it 
may lead the next coalition government, which could consist of 
the PDS and four or five smaller progressive parties or the 
PDS and one of the larger parties (DC or LN). 
Conclusion 
Th i s study showed that both the DC and PDS, and the 
Italian party system are in a state of flux. The next Italian 
national election may result in a change in the composition of 
government and a fundamental realignment of the Italian party 
system. This realignment, however, is not peculiar to Italy, 
but could possibly happen in Canada where the Reform party and 
the Bloc Quebecois are threatening the traditional political 
parties. These changes suggest that new cleavages are emerging 
in both political systems. 
Italy no longer is a unique democracy in which one party 
(the DC) dominates government and one party is excluded from 
government (the PCI). Instead the Italian party system is 
beginning to resemble the party systems of other western 
democracies, which are characterized by an alternation of 
parties in government and high levels of voter volatility. In 
the future, a bipolar system may eventually emerge. 
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